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1Chapter 1
How Does Social Security Work?
The year 2015 marked the eightieth anniversary of Social Secu-
rity.1 The federal government spends more on Social Security than 
it does on any other single program—its outlays account for nearly 
a quarter of all federal spending (Meyerson and Dacey 2013). Social 
Security is arguably the most important social program in the United 
States, providing the main source of retirement income for most peo-
ple. Its importance as a regular, reliable source of retirement income 
has increased in recent years with the decline in employer-provided 
defined benefit plans, which previously dominated the U.S. retire-
ment income system. Over time, however, 401(k) plans have replaced 
them as the prevailing plan, and more recently, Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) have become the most important type of private-
sector plan (Investment Company Institute 2015). Thus, people have 
a greater need for the insurance protection Social Security benefits 
provide, but changes already in place are reducing the generosity of 
its benefits for future retirees (Turner 2001; Weller 2016).
Yet Social Security is in need of reform. It does not have suf-
ficient financing to pay promised benefits, and the option of main-
taining the status quo is not feasible. In addition, with increases in 
longevity at older ages, reforms are needed to better target benefits to 
older persons. While there have been many proposals for Social Secu-
rity reform, they generally are ad hoc in nature, meaning that they do 
not address the fundamental financing problem. 
As demonstrated later in this book, the fundamental problem is 
that in the current demographic era where the old-age dependency 
ratio (the ratio of Social Security beneficiaries to covered workers) 
is increasing, the Social Security benefit formula causes benefits to 
grow faster than the tax revenues that finance them. Thus, while the 
problem can be viewed as one of demographics (which is a problem 
that cannot be fixed), I argue that the problem is the structure of the 
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benefit formula. Although ad hoc reforms have a place, they do not 
fundamentally restore Social Security to solvency. The current Social 
Security benefit formula is not financially sustainable in the long run 
without periodic reforms.
Technically, the solutions for fixing Social Security are easy, but 
the reality is that politically fixing Social Security is a difficult, com-
plex problem. This book tackles the political problem. 
Social Security reform can involve a major change to its structure 
or it can involve adjustments to the levels of key parameters in the cur-
rent structure. Thus, a distinction can be made between paradigmatic 
reform versus parametric reform. Paradigmatic reform would involve 
a major change in the fundamental structure of Social Security, such 
as by introducing individual accounts. President George W. Bush 
attempted paradigmatic reform by introducing individual accounts, 
but that effort met fierce opposition and ultimately was dropped. 
Parametric reform involves changing the value of the parameters of 
the system without changing the structure, such as raising the tax rate 
that finances benefits or reducing the generosity of benefits. Para-
metric reform usually involves relatively small changes to the basic 
parameters of the Social Security system—the payroll tax rate, the 
maximum level of earnings subject to the payroll tax, the generosity 
of benefits, the cost-of-living indexing of benefits in payment, and the 
age at which benefits can be received. Social Security reform in the 
United States traditionally has been parametric reform. 
In addition to the division between paradigmatic reform and para-
metric reform, a new category of reform can be called extreme para-
metric reform. Whereas parametric reform involves relatively small 
changes in the parameters of Social Security, extreme parametric 
reform involves dramatic changes. An example is Vermont Senator 
and 2016 presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’s Social Security pro-
posal, which would subject all income, not just labor market income, 
above $250,000 to the Social Security payroll tax (Backman 2016).
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SCOPE OF THIS BOOK
This book focuses on parametric reform of Social Security, but it 
also discusses issues related to some paradigmatic reform options that 
have received attention from policy analysts. Paradigmatic reform 
generally would involve a move toward individual accounts and 
away from the risk sharing provided by the current Social Security 
program. Individual accounts have been discussed by Turner (2006), 
as well as a number of authors. Such a move is already occurring 
through the decline in employer-provided defined benefit plans and 
the growth of 401(k) plans and IRAs. 
Rather than cover the full range of possible reforms, this book 
analyzes a set of promising reforms related to increased life expec-
tancy, the increasingly strong relationship between income and life 
expectancy, the decline in the physical demands of jobs, the rise in 
income inequality, the pattern of poverty increasing at older ages, and 
other demographic and economic changes. It also discusses possible 
reforms to assure Social Security’s sustainability and to allow it to 
do a better job of achieving its goals, particularly in regard to the 
fairness of the benefit structure. Because an increasing ratio of retir-
ees to workers is making it more costly to provide benefits, future 
reforms are needed. That ratio is described later as the “price” for 
current Social Security benefits in a pay-as-you-go system (Turner 
1984) and is a key factor in the analysis of Social Security reform, 
though other issues relating to the distribution of Social Security ben-
efits across different economic and demographic groups also warrant 
our attention. 
Policy analysts sometimes argue that focusing on Social Secu-
rity reform is too narrow and that the focus should also include other 
issues such as private pensions, disability, poverty programs, work 
opportunities for older persons, and health care. While that argument 
has merit, I do not take that approach here, primarily for reasons of 
scope. A fuller discussion of issues related to longevity policy (which 
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is policy dealing with retirement and income issues for older Ameri-
cans resulting from lengthening life spans) can be found in Turner 
(2011). 
This chapter briefly discusses the motivation for the book, given 
that there are already many books about Social Security. It then dis-
cusses the early history and the basics of Social Security—its ben-
efits, its financing, and the need for reform to maintain solvency. The 
chapter then provides an overview of the remaining chapters.
STAND ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS
A number of excellent books that deal with Social Security reform 
have already been written. Barr (1993) and Thompson (1998) discuss 
the economic effects of social security on labor markets, savings, 
investment, and economic growth; Schieber and Shoven (1999) and 
Holzmann and Stiglitz (2001) focus in part on the question of adding 
individual accounts to a Social Security system; Diamond and Orszag 
(2004) present what they consider to be a balanced approach to Social 
Security reform; Schieber (2012) discusses whether the Social Secu-
rity trust funds add to national savings; and Weller (2016) focuses on 
benefit enhancements for vulnerable groups. In addition, I have writ-
ten or edited four books covering different aspects of Social Security 
reform. Gillion et al. (2000) and Szczepański and Turner (2014a) ana-
lyze Social Security reform in an international context; Turner (2006) 
analyzes individual accounts as an aspect of Social Security reform; 
and Turner (2011) proposes that Social Security adopt an explicit lon-
gevity policy, an issue also taken up in this book. 
The existence of all this literature prompts the question, why do 
we need another book on Social Security reform? First, economic 
analysis has progressed, particularly with the development of behav-
ioral economics, but also with the development of the economics of 
financial literacy and the economics of financial advice. In addition, 
researchers continue to study aspects of Social Security and retire-
How Does Social Security Work?   5
ment using traditional approaches. Second, the relationship between 
income and mortality has changed—higher-income people are living 
substantially longer than lower-income people. Third, the percentage 
of income above the taxable maximum income has increased substan-
tially. These three developments all suggest the need for changes in 
the current Social Security system.
This book makes the following contributions: 1) it stresses the 
role of the old-age dependency ratio as a shadow price for Social 
Security benefits and how its increase affects Social Security reform, 
2) it identifies the exact nature of a sustainable benefit formula, 3) it 
makes use of recent developments in behavioral economics to propose 
an improvement of the reform process, and 4) it identifies the role of 
longevity insurance benefits in the early history of Social Security 
and proposes that they be restored. In addition, the book argues for an 
explicit longevity policy for Social Security, as done earlier in Turner 
(2011). 
One of the issues in writing this book was determining the cri-
teria for promising Social Security reforms. An academic reviewer 
criticized the book for its policy proposals’ lacking novelty. Strictly 
speaking, that is not true since several of the proposals are new. How-
ever, most of the proposals discussed in this book have been made 
earlier, some of them by me. While novelty may be the appropriate 
criterion for an academic publication, it is a weak criterion for pub-
lic policy, which should consider proposals that protect vulnerable 
groups, treat different groups equitably, and are cost effective. Rather 
than include every proposal that has been scored by the Social Secu-
rity Actuaries, this book discusses some of the proposals currently 
debated by presidential candidates for the 2016 election, using that as 
a filter to determine proposals that are viewed in the political arena 
as having merit. These proposals are included not for their popular-
ity, which is fleeting as candidates depart from the spotlight. While 
academics may judge proposals based on their novelty, politicians 
promote proposals in an attempt to garner votes. Because the cost of 
the proposals is not always taken into account, this is not a perfect 
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criterion either, but it is at least a real-world test of what politicians 
think appeals to their constituencies. 
HISTORY 
Individualism versus Solidarity
Individualism plays a stronger role in American culture than it 
does in other countries, particularly in Western Europe. With this 
view, individuals and their families are self-reliant and do not depend 
on government programs. Through hard work, they are able to meet 
their own needs. Another vision of society that is more common in 
some European countries is solidarity, in which people recognize that 
capitalism can have losers as well as winners, and sometimes things 
occur through no fault of individuals that make it difficult for them to 
meet their needs through the market economy. 
These two views of society lead to two different views of retire-
ment programs. With the individualistic view, individuals and families 
save for retirement primarily on their own or through their employers. 
With solidarity, government social security programs are needed to 
assure that all individuals have adequate resources in retirement. 
Social Security was enacted during the Great Depression, which 
demonstrated forcefully that individuals are not always able to rely 
on their own efforts in labor markets to support themselves and their 
families. It gave support to a movement in society favoring govern-
ment programs based on solidarity, which collectively are sometimes 
called the New Deal programs. 
The politics of support for Social Security has changed over time. 
Arguably, the increase in support for an individualistic form of retire-
ment savings, such as individual savings accounts, occurred during 
the long bull market for stocks leading up to the election of Presi-
dent George W. Bush. That support was due in part to the passage of 
time since a major event had pointed out the shortcomings of relying 
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primarily on the financial market for providing retirement income. 
It also may be attributed to changing demographics, with an aging 
population raising the old-age dependency ratio and making it more 
costly to provide benefits. The language used to describe Social Secu-
rity as an entitlement program (rather than as a risk sharing or social 
insurance program) has negative connotations for those who favor 
an individualistic approach to providing retirement income, such as 
those supporting President George W. Bush’s proposal for individual 
accounts. Turmoil in the stock market since 2000 presumably has 
eroded support for individual accounts because it has underscored the 
financial risks involved with that approach.
Longevity	Insurance	Benefits	
While some fundamental aspects of Social Security have not 
changed since its inception in 1940 when Social Security began pro-
viding benefits, it was a much different program than it is currently in 
terms of the nature of the benefits it provided. The benefit eligibility 
age was set at 65 for two reasons: 1) pension plans at that time gener-
ally used either age 65 or 70 as the eligibility age, and 2) actuarial 
calculations indicated that sufficiently few people would qualify at 
age 65 that the program could be financed with a low payroll tax rate 
(Social Security Administration 2016a). Life expectancy at age 65 
was 11.9 years (Bell and Miller 2005). Taking into account the fact 
that people entered the workforce at earlier ages than they do now, 54 
percent of that population would still be alive at age 65 (Glover 1921). 
Thus, Social Security provided benefits at a relatively advanced age at 
which roughly half of those entering the workforce in their youth had 
died, and the benefits were not provided for much more than a decade 
of retirement on average.
Over time, three changes have fundamentally altered the nature 
of the old-age benefits that Social Security provides: 1) the benefit eli-
gibility age was lowered to age 62, 2) life expectancy has increased, 
and 3) people enter the workforce at older ages. Whereas earlier, 
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barely half of workforce entrants survived to receive Social Security 
benefits, now 88 percent of 20-year-olds survive to age 62 to be eli-
gible to receive Social Security benefits (Arias 2014). By comparison, 
had the retirement age remained at 65 and the workforce entry age 
remained at 18, 81 percent of 18-year-olds would still be alive at age 
65, compared to 54 percent in 1940. Therefore, most of the increase in 
the likelihood of surviving to receive benefits is due to improvements 
in life expectancy rather than the reduction in the benefit eligibility 
age or later entry into the workforce. 
For the population aged 20 in 2008, 50 percent would still be alive 
at age 82 (Arias 2014). Thus, translating the original Social Security 
program into the current setting, according to this measure, Social 
Security would be a program that started paying benefits at age 82.
Using twenty-first century terminology, Social Security at its start 
could be characterized as a longevity insurance benefit program. Lon-
gevity insurance benefits are provided at an old age, when roughly 
half of those entering the workforce will have died, thus making them 
relatively low-cost benefits. Social Security was originally structured 
as a low-cost longevity insurance program providing benefits at an 
advanced age to roughly half of the people who entered the work-
force. Largely due to improvements in life expectancy, it has trans-
formed into a more costly, broad-based program providing old-age 
benefits for most of the population that entered the workforce in their 
youth. 
Costs 
In 2010, life expectancy at age 62 was 23.3 years (Bell and Miller 
2005), compared to 11.9 years at age 65 in 1940. The doubling of life 
expectancy at the benefit eligibility age roughly doubles the cost of 
providing Social Security benefits. These two factors combined—the 
increase in survivorship to receive benefits and the doubling of life 
expectancy at the benefit eligibility age—account for a substantial 
part of the cost increase.
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Projecting into the future, because of the aging U.S. population, 
the percentage of gross domestic product that will be spent on provid-
ing Social Security benefits will rise from almost 5 percent in 2014 to 
6 percent in 2039. While this is not a large change, dealing with it is 
made more difficult by larger increases in other federal government 
benefit programs for health care for older persons. Those expendi-
tures will grow by three times as much, from just under 5 percent of 
GDP in 2014 to 8 percent of GDP in 2039 (Niu and Topoleski 2014).
THE BASICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Despite the current large size of its trust fund, over the long term 
Social Security is designed to be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, 
meaning that annual benefit payments roughly equal annual payroll 
tax receipts. It is not funded like a private sector pension plan, which 
must have advance funding roughly equal to its liabilities for future 
benefit payments. It has an unfunded liability that is not counted as 
part of the national debt of the United States. Social Security is not 
financed by general tax revenues and is thus not a liability against 
them in the future; rather, it is financed by the payroll tax. 
Benefits	
Social Security provides benefits based on a formula and thus 
differs from defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, where 
benefits are based on the amount saved in an individual account. 
Workers must pay Social Security taxes or contributions for 10 years 
to be eligible for benefits. Social Security pools economic risks that 
individuals face, such as unemployment and wage growth risks, as 
well as demographic risks, such as the risk of outliving one’s income 
by living longer than expected. 
Social Security provides benefits in the form of a price-indexed 
annuity. It provides monthly benefits that continue until the worker’s 
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death and then provides survivor benefits to the worker’s spouse if the 
spouse qualifies for those benefits. It provides a base level of benefits, 
with most workers needing to supplement it with pensions and sav-
ings. Social Security, pensions, and savings are often referred to as the 
“three-legged stool” of retirement income, though many people do 
not have a pension or substantial savings. Some retirees, particularly 
those in their sixties, supplement Social Security benefits with earn-
ings from work.
Social Security calculates individual benefits based on the aver-
age of the worker’s 35 highest years of wage-indexed earnings. For 
workers with less than 35 years of earnings, zeroes are added in for 
the missing years when calculating average earnings. The worker’s 
total indexed monthly earnings in the high 35 years are divided by the 
product of 35 × 12 to determine the average indexed monthly earn-
ings (AIME).
An alternative approach that would have the advantage of includ-
ing all covered earnings would be to base benefits on total lifetime 
indexed covered earnings rather than average earnings. That approach 
would thus count all covered earnings and could have the effect of 
encouraging (rather than discouraging) continued work at older ages.
The formula for estimating an individual and spouse’s Social 
Security benefits is complex. It can be thought of as occurring in four 
steps: 1) calculate the AIMEs, 2) calculate the worker’s primary insur-
ance amount (PIA), 3) make adjustments for early or late retirement, 
and 4) calculate the spouse or survivor benefits. These four steps are 
explained more fully below.
First, benefits are computed based on career wages, but only 
on wages up to the taxable maximum. The taxable maximum earn-
ings rises in line with wage inflation. Wages in earlier years also are 
indexed in the benefit calculation. In the United States, rather than 
indexing these wages for price inflation, they are indexed based on 
the growth in economy-wide average wages. 
Wages are indexed up to the year the worker turns 60. Wages 
earned after age 60 are included without deflating them back to the 
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base earnings as of age 60 (expressing them in age-60 earnings, which 
would be lower because of the effect of inflation over time). 
Second, workers retiring at the normal retirement age receive a 
benefit called the PIA. For many years, the normal retirement age, 
which refers to a parameter in the benefit formula and not to when 
most people retire, was age 65. It is now slowly increasing to age 67. 
For persons reaching age 62 before 2000, the normal retirement age 
was 65. It will increase gradually to 67 for persons reaching that age 
in 2027 or later.
The PIA is calculated from the AIME using a benefit formula that 
has three segments. At the end of the first earnings segment, AIMEs—
which in 2016 are up to $856—are multiplied by 0.9. AIMEs in the 
second earnings segment, between $856 and $5,157, are multiplied 
by 0.32. AIMEs in the third earnings segment, above $5,157, are 
multiplied by 0.15. Then the three amounts are combined to deter-
mine the PIA. The maximum earnings for each segment are called 
the bend points of the Social Security benefit formula because when 
the formula is graphed, they are points where the slope of the line 
indicating the relationship between the AIME and the PIA changes. 
Possible changes in the Social Security benefit formula are discussed 
in Chapter 3.
Third, benefits first received at ages other than the normal retire-
ment age are increased or decreased for later or earlier retirement. 
Fourth, as well as providing benefits to workers based on their labor 
market earnings, the program also provides benefits to spouses of 
workers who have not worked or who have fewer years of work or 
lower earnings than their higher-earning spouses. Social Security 
also provides survivor benefits to those spouses upon the death of the 
insured worker. A person can receive spouse and survivor benefits 
if those are higher than the person’s own retired worker benefits. A 
spouse cannot claim a spouse benefit until the other spouse claims his 
or her retired worker’s benefit. 
Survivor benefits can be claimed beginning at age 60, but spousal 
benefits cannot be claimed until age 62. The spousal benefit depends 
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on the age at which the spouse retires. If the person receiving the 
spousal benefits claims those benefits between age 62 and their full 
retirement age, the amount will be permanently reduced by a percent-
age based on the number of months up to his or her full retirement 
age. If the person receiving spousal benefits starts taking those ben-
efits at his or her full retirement age, the benefits will be half as much 
as the worker’s benefits. The exact determination of survivor benefits 
is complicated (Henriques 2012), but survivor benefits are affected by 
the age at which the spouse claims benefits because delayed claiming, 
up to age 70, raises the worker’s benefit. The survivor’s benefit equals 
the worker’s benefit. 
The benefit formula with its lower adjustment factor for higher 
earners is progressive, meaning that it provides more generous ben-
efits relative to past earnings for those who have lower earnings. The 
progressivity in annual benefits is offset somewhat, however, when 
considering lifetime benefits, because people with higher earnings 
tend to live longer than people with lower earnings. The progressivity 
is also offset because people with higher earnings tend to postpone 
receipt of Social Security benefits, which currently they can do on a 
favorable basis. The lifetime value of Social Security benefits goes up 
for most workers postponing their receipt (up to age 70), even if the 
person does not continue working, but the gain from postponing is 
greater for people with longer life expectancy, who tend to be people 
with higher incomes. 
In 2013, the average annual benefit for a worker and spouse was 
$24,660 and for a widow or widower was $14,604 (Reno and Walker 
2013). Social Security benefits in payment are adjusted each year that 
there is price inflation to keep up with the Consumer Price Index for 
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). Upper-income 
beneficiaries pay income taxes on part of their Social Security ben-
efits, but for the rest of recipients the benefits are received tax free.
To help participants plan for their future Social Security benefits, 
the Social Security Administration announced in 2014 that it would 
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send Social Security Statements once every five years for most peo-
ple—for those aged 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, and 60—and every year 
for people aged 61 and older who are not already receiving benefits 
(Social Security Administration 2014). Because the growth of 401(k) 
plans is placing greater responsibility on workers for retirement plan-
ning, it is important that the government provides reliable information 
about future Social Security benefits and possible changes in those 
benefits (Kritzer and Smith 2016). However, the usefulness of these 
statements for younger workers is questionable because these ben-
efit statements assume that promised Social Security benefits will be 
paid. It is likely, especially for younger workers, that Social Security 
reform will result in less generous benefits than promised in current 
law, which raises the point that the uncertain future of Social Security, 
with its future insolvency, creates a problem for financial planning for 
retirement and financial advice relating to retirement.
Also in 2014, Social Security began providing benefits to same-
sex couples who were legally married or who were in a nonmarital 
relationship that could be considered marriage for the purposes of 
claiming Social Security benefits. This change was the result of the 
Supreme Court case United States vs. Windsor, which found part of 
the Defense of Marriage Act to be unconstitutional.
While most people think of Social Security benefits as annual 
benefit amounts received, economists use the concept of Social Secu-
rity wealth to measure the lifetime value of Social Security benefits. 
Social Security wealth is the expected present value of Social Secu-
rity benefits. This wealth concept, however, understates the utility 
value of Social Security benefits to participants because it does not 
include the value of the insurance Social Security provides as an 
annuity, wherein it provides benefits as long as the person is alive, 
which provides insurance against outliving one’s income. Social 
Security wealth also does not take into account the utility value of 
Social Security providing benefits that are price indexed, thus protect-
ing the recipient against the effects of inflation.
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Financing 
Most workers in the United States pay the Social Security payroll 
tax to finance the benefits the program provides. About a quarter of 
state and local government workers do not participate in Social Secu-
rity (Reno and John 2012). 
Because Social Security benefits and Social Security taxes are 
both based on the worker’s earnings, the Social Security tax dif-
fers from other taxes in that there is a direct link through the benefit 
formula between taxes paid and benefits received (Burkhauser and 
Turner 1985). For those who ultimately receive Social Security ben-
efits based on their own earnings, increases in earnings, up to the 
Social Security taxable maximum earnings, raise future benefits. It 
is not clear whether workers perceive the details of this relationship, 
but it appears likely that they do understand the relatively simple con-
cept that increases in their earnings lead to increases in future Social 
Security benefits. The generosity of the link between taxes and ben-
efits varies across the population because of the progressive nature 
of the benefit formula and other factors, but if an individual pays 
more Social Security payroll taxes, she generally receives more in 
future benefits. Because of the connection between taxes paid and 
benefits received, the Social Security payroll tax arguably does not 
have some of the adverse effects that other taxes have, such as affect-
ing decisions about work, or at least to the same extent (Burkhauser 
and Turner 1985). 
The Social Security payroll tax is officially called the Fed-
eral Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax; half is paid by work-
ers and half is paid by their employers. The half paid by workers is 
not deducted from their taxable incomes, and thus they pay federal 
income tax on that money. The half paid by employers is not added 
to their taxable incomes, and thus they do not pay income tax on that 
money. Since employers do not give away money, economists gener-
ally argue that the employer half of the payroll tax is ultimately borne 
by workers through reduced wages. The amount paid by the employer 
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is deductible by the employer as a business expense. Self-employed 
workers pay both the employee and employer share of the payroll tax, 
but only half of the tax amount is treated as taxable income. There-
fore, self-employed workers can deduct half of their Social Security 
payroll tax payments from their taxable incomes. 
The OASI payroll tax rate in 2015 was 10.6 percent (employer 
and employee share), and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 tempo-
rarily reallocated a portion of it to the Disability Insurance program 
for 2016–2018. Beginning in 2019, the tax rate for OASI will revert to 
its 2015 rate. The payroll tax rate is set by law, and no future increases 
in the payroll tax rate are legislated. It is levied on the worker’s earn-
ings up to a taxable maximum, which was $118,500 in 2016—about 
6 percent of workers have earnings above that amount. The maxi-
mum is indexed for changes in the national average wage index and 
is adjusted annually. 
The money collected through the Social Security tax is paid into a 
Social Security Trust Fund, where it is used to buy government bonds. 
The interest on these bonds is credited to the trust fund, which is used 
to pay benefits and administrative expenses (Reno and Walker 2013).
OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK 
This book discusses four policy goals for Social Security: 
1) achieving fiscal sustainability, 2) balancing the trade-off between 
system affordability and benefit adequacy, 3) improving equity in the 
distribution of benefits across different types of workers and retirees, 
and 4) reducing political risk. Some of these goals overlap, and some 
involve trade-offs against other goals.
While the book focuses on benefit adequacy, particularly for 
lower-income workers, and financial sustainability as the most 
important issues in reform, Chapter 2 also discusses other criteria that 
have been proposed for evaluating Social Security reform, including 
equity and labor market efficiency. Trade-offs occur between benefit 
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adequacy for lower-income workers and equity, which is taken to 
mean an equal rate of return on contributions for workers in different 
income groups.
Chapter 2 explains why the Social Security system is no longer 
sustainable under its current benefit formula in the face of popula-
tion aging. It discusses the basic options for assuring solvency—rais-
ing revenues, cutting benefits, and raising the early retirement age 
(while adjusting the calculation of benefits so that benefits received 
at age 62 would be instead received at age 63). It considers the pos-
sibility of investing part of the Social Security trust fund in the stock 
market. It discusses the constraints that exist if policymakers decide, 
for example, that the payroll tax cannot be raised, or that benefits 
cannot be cut. While adequacy and sustainability involve trade-offs, 
reforms that are fiscally sustainable may not be politically sustainable 
if they involve declining replacement rates over time. Thus, the book 
examines both fiscal and political sustainability in terms of preserving 
adequate replacement rates.
Chapter 3 examines Social Security benefits and the difficulties 
in defining their adequacy and offers alternate definitions. While the 
preceding chapter looks at adequacy as part of a macro level reform, 
this chapter discusses achieving adequacy through better targeting of 
Social Security benefits. It considers changes in Social Security ben-
efits that could be made in recognition of longer life expectancy, such 
as the possible role of longevity insurance benefits beginning at age 
82. That discussion takes into account the implications of the cross-
sectional pattern of changes in life expectancy in the United States, 
where the improvements have been much greater for upper-income 
workers than for lower-income workers. This chapter includes a dis-
cussion of using the chained CPI to index Social Security benefits in 
payment, noting that it may be a more accurate measure of inflation, 
but that it has adverse consequences as a benefits policy because it 
cuts benefits most for the oldest recipients. 
Chapter 4 discusses retirement issues, such as when to take Social 
Security benefits, and notes various strategies for taking benefits. It 
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also discusses reforms that would affect when people retire, such as 
raising the early retirement age.
Chapter 5 examines issues in the democratic process of Social 
Security reform and considers behavioral aspects of public policy-
making that make it difficult in the United States to achieve Social 
Security reform. The use of a 75-year horizon for benefit solvency 
may increase the difficulty of reform because it marks as inadequate 
reforms that assure solvency for a shorter period. It discusses auto-
matic adjustment mechanisms that some countries have adopted to 
deal with these issues. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the book and provides a set of reform 
recommendations. 
A BALANCED APPROACH
Social Security reform is a controversial topic, with people hold-
ing markedly different views as to how it should be accomplished. 
Recognizing that policy analysts disagree as to what constitutes a 
balanced analysis, this book nonetheless attempts to provide such a 
review and at the same time assess what the best approaches may 
be. While an approach that takes a clearly liberal or conservative 
perspective would probably please roughly half of Social Security 
policy experts, a balanced approach does not have a clearly identifi-
able group of supporters. Recognizing that dilemma, to successfully 
reform Social Security, a spirit of compromise in policymaking will 
be needed.
Note
 1. I follow the convention that references to the Social Security program 
in the United States are capitalized, while references to social security 
programs in other countries or to social security as a concept are not 
capitalized.
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Chapter 2 
Sustainability and 
Financing Reform
Social Security is not financially sustainable with its current benefit 
formula, which promises more benefits than the financing can sup-
port. Reform that either cuts benefits or raises taxes or both will be 
required. The 2015 Social Security Trustees’ Report (2015) projects 
that there will be insufficient assets in the OASI trust fund in 2035, 
less than 20 years away. At that point, Social Security will have suf-
ficient income to pay 77 percent of scheduled benefits. The Congres-
sional Budget Office (2015b) projects that insolvency will occur in 
2031, in part because it projects greater increases in life expectancy 
than does the Social Security Administration.
In 1994, Steuerle and Bakija (p. 3) wrote, “That future reform is 
inevitable, and not simply a political intention, is crucial for policy- 
makers and the American public to comprehend.” Two decades later 
the statement is still true, but Social Security reform has not yet 
occurred. 
The options for achieving financial sustainability now, as they 
were two decades ago, are limited to increasing revenues, reducing 
benefits, and raising retirement ages (with the benefits paid at the 
earlier age being paid at the new retirement age). Looking to inter-
national experience, Canada has achieved sustainability primarily by 
raising revenue, while Germany has achieved sustainability primarily 
by cutting benefits. In its major reform, Sweden raised the retirement 
age, among other changes (Turner and Rajnes 2016). 
This chapter explains why the Social Security system was sus-
tainable earlier in its history but is not sustainable under its current 
benefit formula in the face of population aging. It discusses the basic 
options for restoring and assuring solvency and considers one reform 
that could be considered a paradigmatic reform—investing part of 
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the Social Security trust fund in the stock market. Canada has suc-
cessfully implemented such a reform. The chapter considers the con-
straints that exist if policymakers decide that the payroll tax cannot be 
raised further or benefits cannot be cut. While adequacy and sustain-
ability involve trade-offs, reforms that are fiscally sustainable may 
not be politically sustainable if they involve declining replacement 
rates over time. Thus, the chapter examines both fiscal sustainability 
and political sustainability in terms of preserving adequate replace-
ment rates.
RAISING REVENUE
Raising the Payroll Tax Rate 
Raising the Social Security payroll tax rate is one way to achieve 
financial sustainability for Social Security. From 1980 to 1990, the rate 
increased by a total of 2.24 percentage points. The highest increase 
in one year was 0.72 percentage points, which was the increase in the 
combined employee and employer parts of the payroll tax. In 2011 
and 2012, the employee portion of the payroll tax was temporarily cut 
by 2 percentage points as an economic stimulus to encourage employ-
ment, but then in 2013 the cut was ended, so the payroll tax rate rose 
that year by 2 percentage points. 
In a 2013 Google Consumer Survey, the Center for Economic 
and Policy Research asked people whether the Social Security tax 
had been raised, lowered, or left the same at the beginning of the 
year. Most answered that they didn’t know, while 29 percent correctly 
answered that the tax had gone up. To test the hypothesis that some 
people would always answer that the Social Security payroll tax rate 
had increased because they think that the government is raising taxes, 
the same question was asked in 2014, when no change had occurred. 
In that year, 20 percent answered incorrectly that it had gone up. 
Comparing these two results, it can be argued that only 9 percent 
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actually noticed the increase in 2013, with 20 percent in any year say-
ing that it had increased (Baker and Woo 2014). Based on this result, 
it appears that most people do not perceive a small increase in the 
Social Security payroll tax rate as part of a reform package as having 
a negative effect.
Baker and Woo (2014) argue that an important reason why few 
people noticed the increase in the payroll tax was that both political 
parties agreed that it should occur. Thus, there was no political con-
tentiousness drawing attention to it and bashing the president or the 
party in power. Consequently, the press did not focus on it as a parti-
san issue. Had one political party strongly opposed the increase, the 
survey results would probably have shown much greater awareness of 
the increase. Thus, the acceptability of the payroll tax rate increase to 
the public arguably was due to its bipartisan acceptance in Congress.
Raising the Taxable Maximum Earnings
Another option to raise revenue would be to increase the percent-
age of labor earnings in the economy that is subject to the payroll 
tax. That would be achieved by raising the taxable maximum earn-
ings level. About 7 percent of workers earn more than the taxable 
maximum. In 1937, when Social Security payroll taxes were first col-
lected, about 92 percent of earnings of workers covered by Social 
Security was below the taxable maximum (Congressional Budget 
Office 2015b). Over time, the percentage of labor earnings subject 
to the payroll tax has fallen because of the relatively faster growth 
of income above the Social Security taxable maximum income level 
than below it. In 2015, about 81 percent of the earning of workers 
covered by Social Security was under the taxable maximum earnings 
(Congressional Budget Office 2015b).
Raising the taxable maximum from its 2016 level of $118,500 
to $255,000 would eliminate about a quarter of Social Security’s 
75-year deficit. It would allow Social Security to tax the same share of 
earnings that it did in the 1980s, before the surge in income for high-
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earners reduced the percentage of earnings that was taxable under the 
Social Security payroll tax (Peterson 2015). 
“Soaking the Rich”
Since its inception, Social Security financing has taken into 
account equity, in that participants receive a benefit that is tied to 
their contributions. However, an alternative policy, which can be cat-
egorized as “doing good with other people’s money” (or “soaking the 
rich”), is greatly raising or eliminating the cap on taxable earnings 
and also taxing non–labor market income for higher-income persons. 
Because Social Security benefits are based on taxable labor mar-
ket earnings, this change would also raise benefits for high-income 
workers. To deal with this issue, a cap could be placed on earnings 
used for the purpose of calculating benefits but not for the purpose 
of payroll tax payments. Another alternative would be to raise the 
cap on taxable earnings for workers but eliminate it for employers. 
Thus, employers would pay their half of the payroll tax for persons 
earning, for example, more than a million dollars a year, but ben-
efits for those persons would be based on the taxable ceiling for their 
share of the payroll tax. However, from an economics perspective, it 
is assumed that workers ultimately bear the payroll tax rate paid by 
employers through employers reducing their wages below what they 
otherwise would be, so high earners presumably would effectively 
bear the employer’s payroll tax payments. The United Kingdom has 
eliminated the ceiling for the employer contribution. In addition, it 
has eliminated the ceiling for employee contributions, but employees 
contribute above the ceiling at a reduced rate of 2 percent of pay.
Other Sources of Revenue
Social Security has been financed almost entirely (96 percent) by 
the payroll tax, and partially (4 percent) by the income tax on Social 
Security benefits of retirees with higher incomes (Congressional Bud-
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get Office 2015b). Some people, however, have proposed supplement-
ing that funding with general revenue funding, which presumably 
would be more progressive, meaning that a relatively smaller portion 
of the burden would be placed on low-income workers because the 
Social Security payroll tax is not levied on income above the taxable 
maximum earnings. Thus, people with high incomes do not pay the 
Social Security payroll tax on their labor earnings above that amount. 
Canada, Australia, and Japan all use general revenue funding to dif-
fering degrees, and that source of funding appears to work well in 
those countries. 
Several arguments have been made against using general rev-
enue funding to finance Social Security. As Schieber (2012) notes, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt opposed it because he believed that a 
program fully funded that way would be viewed as a welfare program 
and would not have as much political support. Some argue that having 
dedicated funding for Social Security provides fiscal discipline for the 
program because it forces the program to keep within a set budget. 
However, dedicated funding provides political protection for Social 
Security, in that people feel like they have paid for their benefits, 
making it more difficult to cut them. In the countries that use general 
revenue funding, these arguments against its use do not seem to have 
merit, though they could still apply within the U.S. political system. 
Altman (2015) argues that the estate tax is a legacy tax that could 
be used to help pay off the legacy costs of Social Security. The logic 
of the argument is that Social Security has incurred legacy costs 
because the first generation of benefit recipients, who had suffered 
the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression, received far more 
in benefits than they had paid for. This intergenerational transfer from 
later, higher-income generations to the first generation can be justified 
based on the economic hardship that generation suffered. 
Other sources of revenue could also be used. For example, 
unclaimed pension benefits in defined contribution plans, assets that 
have benefited from favorable tax treatment for the purposes of pro-
viding retirement income, could be used for Social Security financing 
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(Bruce and Turner 2003). With defined benefit plans, if the benefit 
is unclaimed the money stays in the plan, ultimately to the benefit 
of the plan sponsor who needs to contribute less to fund promised 
benefits. The money is owned not by the plan or plan sponsor but by 
the individual participant. Nonetheless, for various reasons, such as 
workers forgetting about or not being able to find pensions at previous 
jobs, some defined contribution accounts are never claimed. Using 
this unclaimed money for Social Security financing would solve the 
problem of what to do with it, and it would have the advantage of 
keeping the money within the retirement income system.
Extending Coverage to State and Local Government Workers
About 25 percent of state and local government workers—6.5 
million workers—are not covered by Social Security. A proposal 
to cover all newly hired state and local government workers would 
finance about 8 percent of Social Security’s funding gap (Reno and 
John 2012). Diamond and Orszag (2004) argue that Social Security 
coverage should be extended to all state and local government work-
ers. When Social Security was first established, large transfers were 
made to the initial generation of beneficiaries, who had suffered eco-
nomically during the Great Depression and World War II. Diamond 
and Orszag (2004) argue that the cost of those transfers should be 
borne by all contemporary workers, including the relatively well-paid 
workers in state and local governments who currently do not partici-
pate in Social Security.
Investing in the Stock Market 
One way to raise revenues is to invest part of the Social Secu-
rity trust fund in the stock market. Countries establish trust funds for 
their pay-as-you-go social security programs in order to smooth out 
variations in contributions that occur over time, in part due to changes 
in the unemployment rate. A few countries have invested some of 
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the assets of their social security trust fund in financial markets to 
improve expected returns and diversify risks. 
This policy can be viewed as a form of social security privatiza-
tion, in that the assets held by the social security program are invested 
in the private sector. It increases the financial risks associated with 
the trust fund investments compared to the current approach, but the 
greater risk of well-diversified investments is compensated for by 
greater expected reward. A diversified portfolio of stocks and bonds, 
combined with a strategy of asset rebalancing to control risk, would 
reduce financial market risk and generally earn a higher rate of return 
than does the current trust fund investment in government bonds. 
Investing in the stock market this way would involve substantially 
lower administrative costs than individual accounts, and investment 
and mortality risks would be pooled more effectively (Munnell and 
Sass 2006).
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) invests its trust fund assets 
in financial markets, and the investments are managed by the CPP 
Investment Board (CPPIB), a professional investment manage-
ment organization that is independent of political influence (CPPIB 
2013a).1 Canada has achieved independence from political influence 
through the governance structure of the CPPIB, which is accountable 
to an independent board of directors. 
The Canada Pension Plan invests in a wide range of assets—in 
2013, 50.0 percent of its investments were in equities, 33.1 percent 
were in fixed income, and 16.9 percent were in real assets, including 
real estate (CPPIB 2013b). The investments include public equities, 
private equities, corporate and government bonds, private debt, infra-
structure, real estate, and other investments. In fiscal year 2015, the 
CPP earned a net rate of return (after fees) of 18.5 percent. Its annual-
ized 5- and 10-year rates of return were 12.3 percent and 8.0 percent, 
respectively (CPPIB 2016). By comparison, in 2014, the OASI trust 
fund earned a rate of return of 3.6 percent on the government bonds 
that it holds (Social Security Administration 2016b). If the trust fund 
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earned a higher rate of return, that would help reduce Social Secu-
rity’s future deficit.
The Thrift Savings Plan for most U.S. federal government work-
ers is the largest defined contribution plan in the United States and 
provides a model for how government-managed investing can be 
done without political interference. It is entirely passively managed, 
with all its investments in index funds. The CPP investments, by con-
trast, are actively managed.
A funded system can be invested in government bonds, as is cur-
rently done for the Social Security trust funds, or it can be partially 
or fully invested in financial markets. An unfunded social security 
system involves implicit future liabilities for the government, while a 
system invested in government bonds involves explicit liabilities for 
the government. In that sense, assuming the government has equal 
responsibility for paying promised benefits in both cases, there is little 
difference between the two approaches. However, investing in equi-
ties would be substantially different in its risk characteristics from 
having an unfunded system.
Munnell (2013) argues in favor of investing part of the trust funds 
in the stock market. She argues that doing so would make it more 
difficult to use the trust funds to cover shortfalls in other parts of the 
government budget. With current government accounting, if Social 
Security has a surplus of $100 billion and the rest of the budget has a 
deficit of $150 billion, on net the government has a deficit of $50 bil-
lion. If, however, the trust funds had invested the $100 billion in the 
stock market, that would be considered an outlay, and the government 
budget deficit would be measured as $150 billion, which provides a 
more accurate accounting of government finances. 
An argument against investing the Social Security trust funds in 
the stock market is that a pay-as-you-go system is subject to risks that 
differ from financial market risks. Thus, maintaining a pay-as-you-go 
system alongside a private pension system and private savings is a 
way of diversifying risks in a broad social policy sense.
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CUTTING BENEFITS
While a balanced approach to restoring solvency would seem to 
involve both benefit cuts and revenue increases, some argue that ben-
efit cuts for low-income seniors would be unconscionable because, 
by international standards, the level of U.S. Social Security benefits 
is already quite low. Generally, proposals for cutting benefits are 
targeted at future retirees and leave the benefits of current retirees 
untouched. This approach is generally favored because many current 
retirees have no way to offset the benefit cuts. Some future retirees 
could extend their working lives to offset the cuts or they could save 
more on their own. However, counter to the general principle of not 
cutting benefits for people already retired, President Obama proposed 
changes in price indexing that would reduce future benefits of current 
retirees.
Many people, particularly at older ages, rely almost exclusively 
on Social Security for their retirement income, and because of that 
their retirement incomes are quite low. Cutting benefits for those 
people would cause real harm. For this reason, it would appear that 
benefit cuts should not be across-the-board cuts but instead should be 
targeted, such as by excluding people aged 80 and older. This type of 
targeting is functionally similar to providing a longevity insurance 
benefit at age 80, which is a proposal discussed in Chapter 3. 
Raising the early retirement age in Social Security (62) so that 
benefits can be received at age 63 is yet another step that can be taken 
to restore solvency to Social Security. This option is discussed in 
Chapter 4. We note here, however, that the policy discussed is not an 
immediate raising of the early retirement age but, rather, an increase 
that would occur with a delay and would then be phased in. Propos-
als to immediately raise the early retirement age would be unfair to 
people near retirement who had made their plans based on knowing 
that they would be able to claim Social Security benefits at age 62.
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INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS AND FUNDING
Funded individual accounts are like 401(k) pension accounts, 
which are the most common type of employer-provided defined con-
tribution plan in the United States. Each individual has his or her 
own account to which money is contributed and invested. Funded 
individual accounts have been used to partially or fully replace tra-
ditional pay-as-you-go social security programs in Chile and in some 
other countries, primarily in South America and in Central and East-
ern Europe. With funded individual accounts, the ultimate benefit 
depends on the amount contributed to the account by the worker, 
and possibly the employer and the government, the rates of return 
received, and the fees charged against the accounts. 
A fundamental problem with this type of reform involving social 
security privatization is known as “paying twice.” While workers are 
paying into the new funded accounts, they must continue paying for 
the benefits already promised in the pay-as-you-go system. Some 
countries transitioning from communist economies have been able to 
deal with the paying twice problem to some extent by using the pro-
ceeds of sales from state-owned enterprises to help pay for the ben-
efits in the pay-as-you-go system. Obviously, that approach is not an 
option in the United States, and the paying twice problem is a major 
obstacle to Social Security reform involving individual accounts in 
the United States. 
If the goal of reform is funding or partial funding, that does not 
require individual accounts. Funding can occur within the current 
Social Security program. Canada’s partially funded social security 
program provides an example of a successful reform of this type. With 
its partial funding, the system is projected to maintain solvency over 
the next 75 years with no future increases in payroll taxes or cuts in 
benefits. From the U.S. perspective, that is a remarkable achievement.
With either funded individual accounts or a partially funded tra-
ditional Social Security system, the issue of investment risk arises. 
Sustainability and Financing Reform   29
Investing the assets in financial markets results in investment risk. 
(See Samborski and Turner [2015] for a discussion of different kinds 
of risk.) That is of course true for any investment, including any pen-
sion investment, and it may be that the higher expected rate of return 
justifies the added risk.
A SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFIT FORMULA 
It is commonly argued that Social Security is not sustainable 
because of demographic changes—the combination of people living 
longer and fewer births. This chapter contends that the reason is not 
demography but rather a flaw in the Social Security benefit formula 
that causes the system to be unsustainable in the face of these demo-
graphic changes. 
This section analyzes the characteristics of a sustainable Social 
Security benefit formula in a pay-as-you-go system. Some people 
argue that the payroll tax rate should not be raised further. Such a pol-
icy has consequences for the generosity of Social Security benefits. 
Appendix 2A, the mathematical appendix to this chapter, indicates 
that a consequence of not raising the payroll tax rate would be that a 
sustainable Social Security program would have benefits growing at 
the rate of real wage growth less an adjustment for the rate of growth 
in the old-age dependency ratio, which is the ratio of Social Secu-
rity beneficiaries to covered workers. Many countries, including the 
United States, are seeking to maintain the generosity of their social 
security benefits. The current demographics of an increasing old-age 
dependency ratio, if combined with a fixed payroll tax rate, dictate 
that the Social Security replacement rate must fall. It is not possible to 
maintain the current generosity of Social Security with an increasing 
old-age dependency ratio and a fixed payroll tax rate. This conclusion 
derives from the pay-as-you-go budget constraint, which is that cur-
rent tax payments must be sufficient to pay for current benefits. The 
dynamic pay-as-you-go budget constraint is that the growth in tax 
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payments must be sufficient to pay for the growth in benefits. With the 
labor force growing slower than the number of beneficiaries and the 
payroll tax rate fixed, the growth rate in real benefits must be less than 
the growth rate in real wages for a pay-as-you-go system to maintain 
its financial balance. 
The social security budget constraint limits countries’ social 
security options. If countries have decided that they will not raise 
the social security payroll tax rate or will not reduce benefits, their 
choices are further limited. Because of relatively low birth rates and 
increasing life expectancy at older ages, the number of beneficiaries 
is growing faster than the number of workers. 
POLITICAL SUSTAINABILITY
A social security benefit formula or automatic adjustment for-
mula that is financially sustainable may not be politically sustainable. 
In particular, the replacement ratio or benefit generosity level may 
eventually cause benefits to fall to a level of generosity that is not 
politically acceptable. Some people already believe that that point 
has been reached. Further adjustments may be needed to maintain the 
generosity of social security benefits, such as gradually increasing the 
early retirement age over time. That policy is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 3. Such an adjustment may be justified as life expectancy 
and health at older ages continue to improve, while the percentage 
of the workforce with physically demanding jobs is declining. Many 
countries have made this change, which can penalize workers who 
are no longer able to work, often those at the lower end of the income 
scale whose jobs are low skilled or involve physical labor. Such an 
adjustment should take into consideration the needs of workers unable 
to continue working because of unemployment, the physical nature of 
their jobs, and their health. 
An alternative approach is to provide a flat benefit in addition to 
the existing earnings-related benefit, which would be funded from 
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general revenue (Lind et al. 2013). This proposal is similar to the 
approach taken in Canada and Ireland. A variant of this approach that 
has some appeal is to provide a flat benefit starting at age 82. This is 
a form of longevity insurance benefits, which start at advanced ages. 
They are discussed further in Chapter 3.
CONCLUSIONS
The Social Security pay-as-you-go budget constraint can be ana-
lyzed to determine the properties of sustainability for social security 
programs, either through the structure of their benefit formulas or 
through automatic adjustment mechanisms. While people disagree 
about the politically acceptable level of the payroll tax rate, when 
countries reach the point where further increases in the payroll tax 
rate are no longer politically feasible, the implications for the gen-
erosity of social security benefits become clear. With increasing old-
age dependency ratios, the generosity of benefits, as measured by the 
replacement ratio, must decline. This decline can be offset by increas-
ing the age of eligibility for benefits.
This chapter explains the requirements for a benefit formula for 
pay-as-you-go social security programs that will assure solvency over 
the long run. The benefit formula automatically adjusts to economic 
and demographic changes in a way that is stable and sustainable. The 
United States has a relatively low payroll tax rate for Social Secu-
rity compared to other countries, and thus presumably has room for 
further increases. Once a country reaches its maximum acceptable 
social security payroll tax rate, a social security system with a ben-
efit formula that sets the growth in average real benefits over time 
equal to the growth in the real wage minus the growth in the old-age 
dependency ratio will be sustainable with respect to demographic and 
economic fluctuations. Social security programs, such as that in the 
United States, that set the rate of growth of real benefits per benefi-
ciary equal to the rate of growth of real wages, which maintains a 
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constant replacement rate over time, will not be sustainable over the 
long run because of population aging. 
Note
 1. According to the most recent report by the Chief Actuary of Canada 
(released November 2013), the CPP is sustainable throughout the 
report’s 75-year projection period. Contributions are projected to 
exceed annual benefits paid through 2022, after which a portion of the 
CPPIB investment income will be needed to help pay retirement ben-
efits (Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 2013). 
Appendix 2A  
Mathematical Derivation of a Sustainable 
Social	Security	Benefit	Formula
With a pay-as-you-go social security system, the total benefits paid out 
in a year equal the total payroll tax payments received. That relationship can 
be expressed in Equation (2A.1) as a budget constraint, where B is average 
benefits in real terms, N is the total number of beneficiaries, t is the payroll 
tax rate (or contribution rate), w is the average real wage, and L is the number 
of workers.
(2A.1) BN = twL    
That budget constraint can be rewritten in terms of percentage changes 
over time, where E is the percentage change operator (technically, the deriva-
tive of the natural logarithm).
(2A.2) E(BN) = E(twL)   
For social security to continue to maintain financial balance, the growth 
rate in total real benefit payments must equal the growth rate in total real 
payroll tax payments. 
For countries that have a fixed payroll tax rate, t, having reached the 
maximum level considered politically acceptable, the constraint becomes 
(2A.3) E(BN) = E(wL)    
Thus, the growth rate in total real benefit payments must equal the 
growth rate in total real wages. This constraint can be disaggregated into the 
growth rates in its component parts and expressed in terms of the economic 
and demographic changes that limit the sustainable growth in real benefits, 
and then expressed as a formula for the growth rate in average real benefits 
per beneficiary.
(2A.4) E(B) + E(N) = E(w) + E(L)   
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(2A.5) E(B) = E(w) + E(L) – E(N)   
Thus, Equation (2A.5) indicates that to maintain solvency, the growth 
rate in average real benefits must equal the growth rate in real wages plus 
the difference between the growth rate in the labor force and the growth rate 
in beneficiaries. In most advanced western countries, because of population 
aging, the growth rate in beneficiaries exceeds the growth rate of the labor 
force. 
Changes in the ratio of beneficiaries to covered workers (the old-age 
dependency ratio) play a key role in social security financing in pay-as-you-
go systems. 
(2A.6)  E(B) = E(w) − E(N/L)    
Equation (2A.6) indicates that a sustainable social security program 
would have benefits growing at the rate of real wage growth less an adjust-
ment for the rate of growth in the old-age dependency ratio. Equations (2A.5) 
and (2A.6) are different expressions of the fundamental equation for con-
structing a sustainable automatic adjustment mechanism or benefit formula. 
Mechanisms or benefit formulas that are not consistent with those equations 
will not be sustainable over the long run.
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Chapter 3 
Benefit	Adequacy
This chapter discusses achieving benefit adequacy through better 
targeting of Social Security benefits. It considers the role of longevity 
insurance benefits for those aged 82 and older, as well as other changes 
in Social Security benefits that could be made as part of a longevity 
policy in recognition of longer life expectancy. That discussion takes 
into account the implications of the cross-sectional pattern of changes 
in life expectancy in the United States, where the improvements have 
been much greater for upper-income workers than for lower-income 
workers. This chapter also examines the chained Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), noting that it may be a more accurate measure of infla-
tion, but that it has adverse consequences as a benefits policy because 
it cuts benefits most for the oldest recipients. 
MEASURING BENEFIT ADEQUACY
Social Security plays a key role in providing income to U.S. retir-
ees. Nine out of 10 persons aged 65 and older receive Social Secu-
rity benefits. In 2013, the average Social Security benefit was $1,294 
a month, or $15,528 a year. Among persons aged 65 and older, for 
22 percent of married couples and 47 percent of unmarried persons, 
Social Security benefits constituted 90 percent or more of their retire-
ment income (Social Security Administration 2014). Thus, more than 
a third of retirees rely almost exclusively on their Social Security ben-
efits. About 65 percent of benefit recipients receive Social Security 
benefits that account for more than half of their retirement income 
(Reno and Walker 2013).
Retirement income for purposes of these statistics is measured as 
regular income receipts and does not include irregular withdrawals 
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from IRAs, 401(k) plans, and other forms of savings. It thus under-
states the resources used for retirement consumption and overstates 
the role of Social Security. Nonetheless, these statistics on the abso-
lute size of Social Security and on its relative share of retirement 
income indicate the importance of Social Security benefits to retirees.
Benefit adequacy is generally measured in relative terms by cal-
culating a replacement rate, which is a ratio that compares the level 
of benefits in retirement to the level of the worker’s preretirement 
earnings. The concept is based on the life cycle theory of consump-
tion, which holds that people attempt to maintain their preretirement 
standard of living into retirement. Because retirees no longer save for 
retirement, they have access to a higher percentage of their income for 
consumption than they did before they retired. Thus they can receive 
lower income than their preretirement income and still maintain their 
standard of living.
Financial advisers generally measure the replacement rate as 
retirement income received in the first full year of retirement rela-
tive to preretirement earnings in the last year or last few years of 
work. It is often argued that a replacement rate of 70 percent is needed 
for most workers. A full discussion of what target replacement rates 
should be is beyond the focus of this book, but it should be noted 
that target replacement rates vary by income, being lower for higher-
income persons. In addition, replacement rates don’t work nearly as 
well as a measure of retirement income adequacy in a defined con-
tribution environment, where pensions do not provide regular flows 
of income, as they did in a defined benefit plan environment, where 
pensions provided annuities (Hurd and Rohwedder 2015). 
Confusing further the issue of the adequacy of Social Security 
benefits, Social Security calculates the replacement rate provided by 
Social Security benefits in a different way that is not directly com-
parable to the standard measure (Mitchell and Turner 2010, Biggs 
and Schieber 2014). Instead of price indexing earnings in calculat-
ing lifetime average earnings, Social Security wage indexes earn-
ings. Because wages generally grow faster than prices, wage index-
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ing results in a larger value for earnings in the denominator of the 
replacement rate than does price indexing, which results in lower 
calculated replacement rates. While Social Security calculates that a 
typical worker has a replacement rate of about 40 percent, Biggs and 
Schieber (2014), using the methodology generally used by financial 
advisors, calculate that the typical person retiring at age 62 receives a 
replacement rate of 52.
The replacement rate for a medium earner in 2002 using Social 
Security’s method of calculating replacement rates was 39 percent, 
after deducting Medicare premiums. Deducting Medicare premiums 
is done to indicate the replacement rate that is available after that 
expense. By 2030, the replacement rate will fall to 31 percent. The 
decline occurs because of the increase in the normal retirement age, 
because Medicare premiums will be higher, and because of the taxa-
tion of an increased share of Social Security benefits. The income 
floor below which Social Security benefits are taxed is not indexed, so 
that over time an increasing percentage of retirees have income above 
that floor and are thus subject to the tax (Reno and Walker 2013). 
Because Social Security benefits increase when workers postpone 
their start date past age 62, up to age 70, benefit adequacy, measured 
by the level of annual benefits received, increases when a worker 
postpones the age at which he or she claims benefits. While the Social 
Security benefit formula links benefits to average wages, Social Secu-
rity benefits will rise less rapidly over time than wages because of 
the effect of raising the normal retirement age from 65 to 67, which 
is currently being phased in. That change acts as a benefit cut, reduc-
ing benefits at any age they are claimed, relative to what they would 
have been. When the normal retirement age was 65, benefits received 
at age 62 were 80 percent of the full amount (the Primary Insurance 
Amount or PIA). When the normal retirement age reaches 67, which 
is for people born after 1959, benefits at age 62 will be 70 percent of 
the PIA, or a 12.5 percent benefit cut.
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POLICY OPTIONS AND ISSUES
Benefit	Cuts	while	Protecting	Low-Income	Workers	
Social Security reform to restore solvency may involve benefit 
cuts. All of the Republican presidential candidates in 2016 who pro-
vided proposals for Social Security reform, except Donald Trump and 
Mike Huckabee, favored benefit cuts, either through raising the nor-
mal retirement age or through reducing the generosity of the benefit 
formula (Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 2015). 
One extreme option for cutting benefits for higher-income retirees 
is to make Social Security means tested, by which only low-income 
persons would qualify for benefits. Alternatively, at the other extreme, 
means testing could be done so that only high-income persons didn’t 
qualify for benefits. Of course, there is a range of options in between. 
Although means testing would make Social Security benefits more 
targeted, the justification for financing Social Security through the 
payroll tax would be diminished. In addition, means testing would 
introduce adverse incentives, as some people would reduce their eco-
nomic activity to avoid being affected by means testing. Canada and 
Australia both have means tests that start at relatively high income 
levels. The income taxation of benefits for higher-income persons is 
an implicit form of means testing. 
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, a 2016 Republican presiden-
tial candidate, has proposed that Social Security benefits be reduced 
for seniors making more than $80,000 a year in non–Social Security 
income and be completely eliminated for seniors making more than 
$200,000 a year in other income. According to some estimates, if the 
income limits applied to individuals rather than households, the pol-
icy would result in about 2 percent of older persons losing all Social 
Security benefits (Wall Street Journal 2015). 
A benefit cut through raising the normal retirement age would 
be an across-the-board benefit cut and thus would disproportionately 
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affect the retirement income of low-income persons because they 
receive a higher percentage of their retirement incomes from Social 
Security. Many low-income persons rely on Social Security for a large 
share of their retirement income. In dealing with the issue of benefit 
cuts, Diamond and Orszag (2004) note that in their proposal, for an 
average earner retiring around 2070, benefits would be 18 percent 
lower than under the current benefit formula but would be roughly 50 
percent higher in real terms (inflation adjusted) than for a new retiree 
currently because of the growth in real income over time.
Life expectancy indexing of benefits is an automatic way of cut-
ting benefits over time to take into account the effects of increased 
life expectancy. In Sweden, life expectancy indexing of benefits is 
done by the use of an annuity divisor that reflects improvements in 
life expectancy at age 65. For each birth cohort, the annuity divi-
sor adjustment is established at age 65, with a provisional adjustment 
made for retirements starting at age 61, which is the benefit entitle-
ment age. No further reductions in benefits for improvements in life 
expectancy occur after the retiree reaches age 65.
Benefit cuts could be targeted by income by making changes in 
the benefit formula that was described in Chapter 1. Recall that there 
are three segments of the Social Security benefit formula. The first 
segment goes up to AIMEs of $856, or $10,272 a year. One approach 
would be to retain the benefits for people with earnings in that seg-
ment. In addition, for higher earners, benefits would be cut in a man-
ner that increased in percentage terms as earnings increased. For 
example, if the benefit adjustment factor for the second segment was 
reduced from 0.32 to 0.26, a person with AIMEs of $4,000, or $48,000 
annually, would have their benefits cut from $1,776.48 to $1,587.84, 
or a decline of 10.6 percent. If Social Security accounted for about 
half of that person’s retirement income, her retirement income would 
decline by about 5 percent. Alternatively, only the benefit adjustment 
factor affecting the third segment of the benefit formula would be 
reduced, which only affects the top earners, approximately 15 percent 
of workers (Diamond and Orszag 2004).
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The United Kingdom has cut benefits by increasing the number 
of years used in benefit calculations—20 percent of average lifetime 
earnings, rather than 25 percent of the average of the best 20 years of 
earnings.
Benefit	Increases—Across	the	Board	or	Targeted?	
Because of the relatively low level of generosity of Social Secu-
rity benefits in the United States, compared to some other countries, 
some people have advocated for across-the-board benefit increases 
(Altman and Kingson 2015), despite the fact that Social Security is 
already facing a funding shortfall. In 2016, the only major presiden-
tial candidate favoring across-the-board benefit increases was Senator 
Bernie Sanders (D). As well as favoring benefit increases for all Social 
Security beneficiaries, he also favors an increase in the generosity of 
the cost-of-living adjustment by using the CPI for the Elderly. The 
Social Security Actuaries assume this would raise the price indexing 
of benefits in payment by 0.2 percent a year. In addition, he favors 
establishing a minimum Primary Insurance Amount of 125 percent of 
the poverty line for workers who have contributed to Social Security 
for 30 or more years (Goss 2016). 
The issue of increases or cuts in benefits raises questions as to 
what should be the role of government versus individuals, families 
and employers in providing retirement income. A 2011 survey finds 
that 3 percent of Americans aged 25–59 expect there to be increases 
in Social Security benefits (Luttmer and Samwick 2015). While eco-
nomics cannot provide answers to whether there will be increases or 
cuts, which ultimately is a political question, it can provide insights. 
In microeconomics, also called price theory, prices play a key 
role in the decisions people make concerning allocating resources. 
The old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of retirees to workers) acts 
as an implicit or shadow price for Social Security benefits (Turner 
1984). The old-age dependency ratio acts as a shadow price because it 
is the marginal cost to workers of increasing Social Security benefits. 
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With the price of benefits rising, it is likely that the share of Social 
Security in retirement income will fall (Doescher and Turner 1988). 
The changing demographics are not favorable to benefit increases.
The ratio of beneficiaries to covered workers acts like a “price” 
(or shadow price) for benefits, meaning the amount the average 
worker must pay in social security taxes to raise the average benefit 
level by one dollar (Turner 1984). For example, when 10 workers 
contribute for every social security beneficiary, a dependency ratio of 
0.10, it costs each worker $0.10 to provide one dollar of benefits to 
each beneficiary. By contrast, when two workers contribute for every 
beneficiary, a dependency ratio of 0.50, it costs each worker $0.50 to 
provide a dollar of benefits. Thus, as the dependency ratio rises with 
population aging, the “price” of providing social security benefits also 
increases. 
With this price, a simple demand-supply model can be developed. 
Generally, economics predicts that, because of the law of downward 
sloping demand curves, when the price of something increases, the 
quantity demanded falls. Thus, the increase in the shadow price of 
social security benefits means that workers would need to pay more in 
payroll taxes to provide the same level of benefits; thus, their demand 
for social security benefits would decline, which would reduce the 
level of benefits provided. 
A related point is that demand is affected not only by prices but 
also by income, and with rising income people may wish to have 
more leisure, including spending a greater percentage of their life in 
retirement. In addition, workers have other intergenerational commit-
ments, namely, to children for public expenditures on education, but 
those expenditures are much smaller than for Social Security.
Between 1970 and 2000, the growth rates in Social Security–
covered workers and beneficiaries were roughly equal, implying no 
change in the old-age dependency ratio, and thus no change in the 
shadow price for Social Security benefits. However, between 2000 
and 2030, according to the intermediate projection of the Social Secu-
rity Administration actuaries, the number of beneficiaries will grow 
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considerably faster than the number of covered workers (Table 3.1). 
That change places pressure on Social Security financing and thus 
strengthens the case for adopting an automatic adjustment mechanism. 
What would be the effects of Social Security benefits increases? 
Some studies suggest that at least to some extent, benefit increases 
would be offset by people decreasing their own savings for retirement 
(e.g., Lachowska and Myck 2015). The effect, however, may not be 
the same for all groups of workers. In particular, low-income workers 
with low savings, who arguably are the target group of such a policy, 
have little in the way of retirement savings to offset against. However, 
an offset can also occur through increased debt holdings, for example 
by having a larger mortgage.
Catch-Up	Benefits	
Workers aged 50 and older who participate in employer-provided 
pensions or Individual Retirement Accounts have the option to make 
additional contributions, called catch-up contributions, a concept that 
could be extended to Social Security. Workers age 50 and older could 
have the option of making extra voluntary contributions to Social 
Year
OASI 
covered workers  
(000)
OASI  
beneficiaries
(000)
Ratio of benefi-
ciaries to covered 
workers (%)
1970  92,788 22,618 24.4
2000 154,624 38,556 24.9
2030 (intermediate 
projection)
184,794 71,547 38.7
Percent change
1970–2000 66.6 70.5  2.0
2000–2030 55.0 85.6 55.4
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Social Security Trustees (2008).
Table 3.1  Projected Percentage Change in Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance	(OASI)	Covered	Workers	and	Beneficiaries,	
Selected	Periods,	1970–2030
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Security. They would contribute both the employer and employee 
share of the payroll tax—10.6 percent. Thus, for every $10.60 extra 
that a worker contributed, the worker would be credited for an extra 
$100 in Social Security earnings for that year, with the possibility of 
crediting up to the payroll tax maximum. The payment could be made 
through regular withholding, if the employer agreed to do that, or 
could be made at the time the person filed their income taxes.
Most civilian workers in the federal government can make vol-
untary contributions to increase their annuity benefit. In the United 
Kingdom, workers can make voluntary contributions to social secu-
rity to receive credit for years in which they were not working, and 
thus to raise their social security benefits. Voluntary contributions 
only apply toward benefits for the basic benefit, which is not earn-
ings related but is based on years of contributions (Government of the 
United Kingdom 2016). This feature allows workers more flexibility 
in planning for their retirement needs. 
Lump	Sum	Benefits	
Given the popularity of lump sum benefits with many workers, 
Social Security could start offering a lump sum benefit in addition to 
the traditional annuity. The lump sum benefit would be paid to work-
ers who postponed retirement past 62 and who opted for it. Instead 
of receiving an increased annual benefit with postponed retirement, 
workers would receive the benefit they would have received if they 
had retired at age 62, plus a lump sum payment when they claimed 
benefits equal to the present expected value of the increase in future 
benefits (Maurer et al. 2016). This option might encourage some 
workers to postpone retirement. While in principle it would appear 
to be revenue neutral for Social Security, it would bring payments 
forward in time and cause Social Security to reach insolvency sooner. 
Some workers might take it because they are worried about the future 
finances of Social Security; others might take it because they have a 
relatively short life expectancy and think it is a better deal than tak-
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ing the increased annual benefits. For that reason, adverse selection 
would result in an increase in benefit costs for Social Security.
An alternative to the proposal by Maurer et al. (2016) is to allow 
workers aged 62 and older who had worked at least 35 years to have 
their contributions invested in the Thrift Savings Plan for federal gov-
ernment workers, the military, and members of Congress. This alter-
native would allow workers to augment funded individual accounts, 
it would encourage workers to keep working, and it could provide 
a lump sum benefit without the problem of adverse selection. The 
employer share of the payroll tax would continue to be paid into the 
Social Security trust fund.
Protections for Women 
Poverty at advanced ages is a substantially greater problem for 
nonmarried women, who have poverty rates at older ages that are 
roughly twice as high as for older people overall (Butrica, Iams, and 
Smith 2004). Because of this financial vulnerability, some Social 
Security reforms are designed specifically to help women, though in 
legislative language the proposals are gender neutral. For example, to 
receive benefits as a divorced spouse, a marriage must have lasted for 
at least 10 years. This protection, which benefits women more than 
men, could be extended on a reduced, pro rata basis to marriages that 
lasted 5–9 years. 
In Germany, the social security benefit rights acquired during 
marriage are automatically evenly split 50-50 between the divorced 
couple, so the benefit rights for the lower-earning spouse depend on 
the length of the marriage. In the United States, for marriages lasting 
more than 10 years, the length of the marriage does not affect the 
amount of Social Security benefits received by a divorcee. The ben-
efits the divorced spouse receives are based on the benefits earned by 
the other spouse, including benefits earned after the marriage ended.
Hillary Clinton, a 2016 Democratic candidate for president, 
favors targeted benefit increases that aim to reduce poverty at older 
Benefit Adequacy   45
ages. Her proposals include raising survivors benefits, which would 
primarily benefit older women. Widows aged 65 and older have sub-
stantially higher poverty rates than other groups that age. Women risk 
falling into poverty when their husbands die because of the reduction 
in Social Security benefits. For a two-earner couple, Social Security 
benefits can fall by as much as 50 percent. Because of economies 
of scale in household expenditures—such as for housing—a single 
person needs substantially more than half of the income of a married 
couple to enjoy the same standard of living of the married couple.
Clinton also favors a credit for persons who spend time out of the 
labor force caring for other persons. This credit would raise the Social 
Security benefits for those persons by raising their average earnings 
used to calculate their benefits (Clinton 2016). The person providing 
care would receive an earnings credit for years of caregiving, which 
would be a credit to their Social Security earnings record. In mar-
riages in which the wife does not work out of the home, the spousal 
benefit serves somewhat the same function as the caregiver’s credit. 
For women with substantial labor market work, a caregiver’s credit 
would offset one of the penalties of time spent out of the labor force. 
Of course, the credit would also benefit men who take off time to 
care for someone. Contribution credits in the United Kingdom can be 
received for years spent taking care of a child or an older or disabled 
relative.
The caregiver’s credit would help women and men who take time 
out of the labor force to care for someone, while not qualifying for 
spousal benefits, and thus reducing their own Social Security benefits. 
Barr (1993) notes that a caregiver’s credit is part of the United King-
dom’s social security program. One problem with such a program 
is verifying that care was actually provided. For young children, the 
need for care can be established solely based on their age. It is more 
difficult to establish the need for care for older persons, where age 
alone is not sufficient evidence.
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Longevity	Insurance	Benefits	
Reintroduction of a longevity insurance benefit as part of Social 
Security could be an important policy innovation, in particular because 
this benefit is generally not provided by the private sector. Longevity 
insurance benefits could be an important component of a policy to 
restore Social Security solvency, offsetting at older ages benefit cuts 
that may be part of a Social Security reform package (see Blake and 
Turner [2014]; Iwry and Turner [2009]; Turner [2013]; Turner and 
McCarthy [2013]; Weller [2016]). Longevity insurance benefits are 
part of the retirement income system in Ireland (Hughes and Turner 
2015), China (Chen and Turner 2015), and Germany (Chen, Hughes, 
and Turner 2016).
The need for longevity insurance benefits arises because in the 
United States poverty rates increase at advanced ages. For example, 
in 2011 the poverty rate was 7.5 percent for people aged 65–69 but 
jumped to 10.7 percent for people aged 80 and older (Wu 2013). If 
measured more accurately, however, the increase in poverty at older 
ages is substantially greater. 
The Supplemental Poverty Measure is designed to correct a num-
ber of shortcomings of the official poverty measure. For example, the 
official poverty measure is based only on expenditures on food, while 
the Supplemental Poverty Measure has a broader definition of essen-
tial purchases (Bridges and Gesumaria 2013). It provides a much dif-
ferent picture of poverty at older ages than does the official poverty 
measure (Table 3.2). While it exceeds the poverty measure by 1.0 per-
centage point for the population as a whole, for the age group 80+ it 
exceeds the poverty measure by 8.3 percentage points. Further, while 
the traditional poverty measure rises from 7.3 to 10.7 percent for the 
population aged 70–74 and 80+, respectively, an increase of 3.4 per-
centage points, the Supplemental Poverty Measure rises from 11.9 to 
19.0 percent for the population aged 65–69 and 80+, respectively, an 
increase of 7.1 percentage points. Longevity insurance benefits would 
address this problem.
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In addition, as dramatic as the increase is in poverty at older 
ages, it understates the risk of falling into poverty at advanced ages 
because of survivorship bias, which occurs because people in poverty 
have higher mortality rates than do the rest of the population. Thus, 
if no one fell into poverty at advanced ages, then poverty rates would 
decline because of survivorship bias, but in fact they increase (Muller, 
Levin, and Turner 2016).
One reason there has not been a popular outcry for a longevity 
insurance benefit may be that the official poverty statistics consider-
ably understate the problem of poverty at advanced ages. In addition, 
the group affected, people in their eighties, are generally not able to 
present the case for themselves. Furthermore, some people may implic-
itly accept that people at advanced ages have financial problems.
Longevity insurance benefits would be relatively inexpensive to 
provide. The ratio of the population 80+ to the population aged 18–64 
is only 5.6 percent (Bridges and Gesumaria 2013), indicating a low 
“shadow price” for those benefits. The Social Security actuaries eval-
uated the longevity insurance benefit proposal of President Obama 
in his fiscal year 2014 budget. They find that such a proposal would 
raise the long-run actuarial deficit by 0.18 percent of taxable payroll 
(Social Security Office of the Chief Actuary 2013). Thus the benefit 
could be financed by a 0.09 percentage point increase in taxable pay-
roll by the employee and employer. The increase in the payroll tax 
rate necessary to finance this benefit would probably be imperceptible 
to most employees and employers.
Table	3.2		Increasing	Poverty	Rate	by	Age	Group	at	Older	Ages,	2011
Age Poverty rate (%) Supplemental poverty measure (%)
60–64 10.8 n/a
65–69 7.5 11.9
70–74 7.3 13.9
75–79 10.0 16.9
80+ 10.7 19.0
NOTE: NA = not available.
SOURCE: Bridges and Gesumaria (2013); Wu (2013).
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These benefits would start payment at an advanced age, such 
as 82. Future Social Security reforms may reduce the generosity of 
Social Security benefits to restore solvency. Most reform packages 
that cut social security benefits raise elderly poverty (Sarney 2008). 
Thus, to prevent a rise in elderly poverty, the generosity of some 
benefits will need to increase to provide better targeting to vulner-
able populations. That goal could be achieved by providing longevity 
insurance benefits. 
While the essence of longevity insurance benefits is that they start 
at an advanced age, they could be structured in different ways. To 
provide an indication of the range of options, three alternative pro-
posals are provided here. First, longevity insurance benefits could be 
provided as a flat benefit to all Social Security beneficiaries starting 
at age 82. This approach would be progressive in that the percent-
age increase in benefits would be greater for people with a low level 
of benefits. Second, the benefits could be provided as a percentage 
increase in the Social Security benefits the person is receiving, with 
perhaps the percentage increasing above age 82. A disadvantage of 
this proposal is that people with higher wealth tend to live longer than 
people with lower lifetime wealth, so providing benefits solely based 
on age would disproportionately help people in the higher wealth 
groups. Third, a more complex proposal would provide longevity 
insurance benefits only to qualifying persons age 82 and older who 
had low Social Security benefits. For low-income persons, the effects 
of benefit cuts later in life when they are least able to work would 
be moderated by such a change. This policy shifts Social Security 
resources toward persons who are both old and have low incomes. 
When this policy is enacted within a fixed budget constraint, with-
out enhanced financing for Social Security, it involves a transfer of 
resources from people who are relatively young (in their early or mid- 
sixties) and well off to people who are old and poor. It thus would 
improve the targeting of Social Security benefits.
President Obama, in his initial proposal for his 2014 budget, 
included a type of longevity insurance benefit in Social Security 
Benefit Adequacy   49
(Office of Management and Budget 2013). That proposed benefit 
would start at age 76, would phase in for each recipient over a period 
of 10 years, and when phased in would provide a benefit equal to 
about a 5 percent increase in the recipient’s Social Security benefits. 
President Obama made this proposal to offset benefit cuts at 
older ages resulting from introducing the chained CPI, arguably a 
more accurate way of measuring increases in consumer prices than 
the traditional CPI because it takes into account changes in consumer 
spending patterns that are caused by changes in relative prices. Its 
cuts, however, would have a cumulative effect that would grow over 
time the longer a person had been receiving Social Security bene-
fits. Thus, it would result in the largest cuts in benefits for the oldest 
beneficiaries. Those cuts would have been offset to some extent at 
advanced ages by the introduction of the longevity insurance benefit. 
Garnishment	of	Social	Security	Benefits
 A topic often not considered when discussing Social Security 
benefits is the possible garnishment of those benefits. Nongovern-
ment creditors cannot garnish a person’s Social Security benefits to 
recover unpaid debt, but the federal government can. These debts 
include unpaid federal income taxes and unpaid student loans. For 
student loans, the government can take up to 15 percent of the Social 
Security benefit, so long as there is at least $750 a month remaining 
(Stinson 2015). With the growth in student debt, this may become an 
increasingly important issue in the future.
Individual Accounts 
Some conservative politicians, economists, and policy analysts 
have taken an individualist approach to how retirement income should 
be provided, favoring individual accounts as part of Social Security. 
Individual accounts play a role in social security systems in some 
countries, including in Central and Eastern Europe (Szczepański and 
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Turner 2014b), the United Kingdom (Blake and Turner 2007), Japan 
(Turner, Watanabe, and Rajnes 1994), Sweden (Turner 2004), China 
(Chen and Turner 2014), Kenya (Kwena and Turner 2013), the Mid-
dle East (Lichtenstein and Turner 2002), and South America (Gillion 
et al. 2000). 
Among the most recent advocates for this policy is Senator Rand 
Paul (KY), a 2016 Republican candidate for president (Craver 2015). 
The policy would reduce the Social Security benefits of those persons 
taking the option, and in exchange part of their retirement benefits 
would be financed by their individual accounts. One effect of such a 
policy is that by reducing contributions to Social Security, the financ-
ing for Social Security would worsen. The policy would also subject 
those benefits received from individual accounts to the risk of market 
downturn, as well as to the risks related to poor financial decision 
making by many people. 
To provide retirement income for low-income workers adversely 
affected by a Social Security reform that involved benefit cuts, 
Mark Warshawsky, former treasury assistant secretary for economic 
policy, has advocated a voluntary individual account add-on to Social 
Security (see Goss, Wade, and Chaplain [2008] for a discussion of 
this proposal). With this add-on, for workers earning below a cer-
tain amount (for example, $40,000 in 2008), employers would auto-
matically deduct 3 percent of an employee’s salary and send it to the 
Social Security Administration to be invested in a voluntary individ-
ual account. The contributions would be voluntary in that workers 
could opt out. The accounts would be managed by a federal govern-
ment agency, such as the Thrift Savings Board, which manages the 
federal Thrift Saving Plan, which is the 401(k)-type plan for most 
federal government workers.
In Sweden, which has mandatory individual accounts as a small 
part of its social security system, an unanticipated problem has been 
that many people have received poor financial advice for managing 
their accounts because of the conflict of interest that financial advis-
ers have—the advice that provides the most income to the adviser 
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is sometimes not the best advice for the client (Weaver and Willén 
2014). This issue could also arise in the United States (see, for exam-
ple, Shen and Turner [2016]; Turner, Klein, and Stein [2016]).
BENEFIT CLAIMING STRATEGIES
For some people, the decision of when to claim benefits can be 
separated from the decision to retire. Those people are predominantly 
people with higher incomes, who have sufficient savings that they 
can afford to retire without immediately receiving their Social Secu-
rity benefits. In this case, the decision changes from a labor supply 
decision about when to stop work to a wealth maximization decision 
about when to claim Social Security benefits. Some advisers recom-
mend that those with sufficient assets spend down 401(k) assets or 
other savings and delay claiming up to age 70. Doing so increases 
monthly benefit payments. 
Despite the increasing labor force participation of women and the 
narrowing of the gender-wage gap, a majority of married women still 
receive most of their Social Security benefits based on their husband’s 
earnings. Most husbands still work more years than their wives and 
have higher earnings (Henriques 2012). The pattern of earnings 
within marriages affects possible claiming strategies.
Claiming strategies for married couples need to take into account 
their effects on the benefits of the survivor. The survivor in a cou-
ple where both have worked in jobs covered by Social Security will 
receive the higher of the benefits they each would receive as an indi-
vidual. For this reason, it may be particularly advantageous for the 
wife to claim benefits early and the husband to postpone claiming 
benefits to an older age. This strategy would increase the wife’s survi-
vor benefits, assuming she outlived her husband.
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ended two benefit claiming 
strategies that were not widely used but among policy experts were 
widely thought to be generous loopholes for married couples sophis-
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ticated enough to use them (Sullivan 2016). Since they no longer are 
available, understanding those options is not important. However, one 
of them is explained here to give an idea of why they were ended. 
Workers aged 65 or younger on April 30, 2016, will lose the abil-
ity to suspend their benefits while allowing their spouses to collect 
under the worker’s earnings record. By suspending their benefits until 
a later date, they formerly were able to increase their future benefits 
because of the adjustment of benefits for postponed retirement. That 
strategy was called “file and suspend.” It allowed a worker to ben-
efit from postponed receipt of benefits while the worker’s spouse was 
simultaneously receiving a spousal benefit based on that worker’s 
earnings record.
CONCLUSIONS
Future changes in Social Security are likely to involve changes in 
benefits. This chapter argues that because of the effect of population 
aging on the shadow price of Social Security benefits, benefit reduc-
tions are far more likely than benefit increases. Adding a longevity 
insurance benefit starting at age 82 would be a targeted way of offset-
ting the adverse effects of benefit cuts for vulnerable persons at older 
ages. The shadow price of such a benefit would be low because of the 
low ratio of persons that age and above to persons of working age.
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Chapter 4 
Retirement Policy
This chapter discusses the issue of when to retire and start taking 
benefits, as well as reforms—such as a longevity policy—that would 
affect when people retire. It compares cross-sectional versus longitu-
dinal standards for evaluating policies concerning retirement age and 
considers changes in the early retirement age, which currently is 62, 
and changes in the normal retirement age, which currently is rising 
to age 67. Changes in the normal retirement age, however, are not 
actually retirement policy but rather changes in the benefit formula.
THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT AGE
Much of the policy discussion about the Social Security retire-
ment age confuses two concepts. Social Security benefits can be 
claimed at age 62, which we refer to as the early retirement age, or 
simply the retirement age. The normal retirement age is referred to 
as the full retirement age, but neither of those terms is descriptively 
accurate, and both can be misleading—the age is not “normal” in the 
sense of what most people do, neither is it “full” in the sense of reach-
ing the maximum benefit level with respect to age. It is a parameter 
in the benefit formula, and it is the age at which a worker can receive 
Social Security benefits that are not reduced for early retirement. 
While many analysts refer to the normal retirement age as the Social 
Security retirement age (for example, OECD [2015]), that use of lan-
guage is misleading, since relatively few people retire at that age and 
everyone can retire at age 62.
The normal retirement age currently varies from age 65 to 67, 
based on year of birth—for workers born between 1943 and 1954 it 
is 66; for people born later, it rises to 67. Liebman, MacGuineas, and 
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Samwick (2005) suggest that the normal retirement age be raised to 
68 as a step toward restoring solvency to Social Security. 
Factors Affecting the Age at Which a Worker Claims Social 
Security	Benefits
The most common age for taking Social Security benefits has 
been 62, though the percentage claiming at that age has declined over 
time, with more people taking benefits at later ages. Over time the 
percentage of men who claim benefits at age 62 has declined consid-
erably, from 56 percent in the mid-1990s to 36 percent in 2016 (Mun-
nell and Chen 2015). 
Benefits increase when a worker postpones the start date for tak-
ing Social Security past age 62 up to age 70. However, for each year 
of postponement, the person receives benefits for one fewer year. 
Thus, the worker faces a trade-off, which depends on how long the 
person expects to live and on the interest rates at the time. The longer 
the person expects to live, the greater the number of years she will 
receive the higher benefit. Therefore, a person with shorter than aver-
age life expectancy may find it advantageous to claim early, while a 
person with longer than average life expectancy would tend to find it 
advantageous to postpone retirement and claim benefits at an older 
age. 
The interest rate affects the present value of future benefits; the 
present value is higher when the interest rate is lower. With increased 
life expectancy and low real interest rates, postponing receiving 
Social Security benefits for many people is currently a good decision, 
at least in terms of increasing the lifetime value of their benefits. Life 
expectancy at age 65 was 13.9 years in 1950 and 19.1 years in 2010 
(Table 4.1). 
By delaying claiming, the individual receives a larger Social 
Security benefit for the rest of his life. Thus, delaying claiming has 
the effect of purchasing an increase in the annuity benefit. The cost 
of the purchase is the benefit lost by delaying. By delaying retire-
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ment for a year, a worker gives up one year’s worth of Social Security 
benefits. In exchange, the worker receives annual benefits that are 8 
percent higher in real terms for the rest of the worker’s lifetime.
For workers the trade-off between postponing benefit receipt an 
additional year and the increase in future annual benefits was actuari-
ally fair at a time when life expectancy was considerably shorter than 
it is now. (Actuarially fair means that the expected present value of 
benefits would be the same whether the person claimed benefits at 
62 or at a later age, up to 70.) The loss in benefits from postponing 
their receipt would be exactly offset by the increase in future annual 
benefits gained by postponing receipt. Because of the increase in life 
expectancy at older ages, it is now in the financial interests of many 
people to postpone benefit receipt. Doing so means that either the per-
son continues working or is able to finance retirement before Social 
Security benefit receipt using other assets and sources of income. 
For people without substantial other assets, which is most people, 
the decision of when to take Social Security benefits is tied to the 
decision of when to retire. Thus, it is not based solely on the age at 
which the expected present value of lifetime Social Security benefits 
would be maximized. The value to a worker of postponing receipt of 
benefits is based not only on the increase in the worker’s own benefits 
but also on the increase in the value of spouse and survivor benefits, 
particularly for men, because their spouses are likely to receive those 
benefits. 
Table	4.1		Life	Expectancy	at	Age	65	(expected	years	of	life	remaining),	
Select	Years,	1950–2010
Year Life expectancy (years)
1950 13.9
1960 14.3
1980 16.4
2000 17.6
2010 19.1
NOTE: Combined life expectancy for males and females.
SOURCE: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2011). 
56   Turner
Because people taking advantage of the generous adjustment for 
postponed retirement are primarily upper-income workers (Bosworth, 
Burtless, and Zhang 2016), this feature is regressive, meaning that 
it disproportionately benefits upper-income workers. For that reason, 
and because it would save Social Security money, the adjustment 
should be reduced so that it is once again actuarially fair. This change 
can be viewed as a technical correction and thus might be easier to 
enact on its own, without being part of a major reform package.
Research has also shown that many people have a low level of 
financial literacy relating to Social Security. In particular, they do not 
understand the effect of delaying claiming on their future Social Secu-
rity benefits, and this lack of knowledge leads them to retire earlier 
than they otherwise would (Benítez-Silva, Demiralp, and Liu 2009).
The decision to retire is also affected by factors related to the work 
environment, such as the physical and mental difficulty of work; the 
pleasantness of the work environment, including relationships with 
supervisors; and the person’s health. For some people, retirement may 
be more related to their nonwork activities, such as caring for another 
person, or the desire to pursue interests outside work. Munnell and 
Sass (2008) argue that some employers may be lukewarm to older 
persons working longer, and age discrimination may be a factor.
A recent survey asked retirees to rate the reasons they had retired 
(Garabato 2016). Notably, only 14 percent said it was due to their 
inability to continue performing their jobs. Because the survey was 
not limited to people retiring before age 62, presumably a smaller 
percentage of the total who had retired before age 62 retired for that 
reason. Also of interest, 24 percent said they retired because they had 
become eligible for Social Security (at age 62) or Medicare (at age 
65).
Life expectancy varies greatly across income classes, a factor that 
complicates Social Security policy. Waldron (2007) has calculated 
projected life expectancy for males, comparing those in the bottom 
half of the lifetime earnings distribution to those in the top half (Table 
4.2). Her findings show that analyses based on improvements in life 
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expectancy are misleading if they do not distinguish between those in 
the bottom half of the lifetime earnings distribution versus those in the 
top half of the distribution. In 1977, life expectancy at age 65 for the 
bottom half and the top half of the earnings distribution differed by 
less than a year (0.7 years). By 2006, the difference was greater than 
5 years (5.4 years). Over this time period, life expectancy improved 
by 1.3 years for those in the bottom half and 6.0 years for those in the 
top half. In addition, Waldron (2013) presents evidence that mortality 
risk for men declines over the income distribution at least up to the 
eightieth percentile (the top 20 percent). Thus, any change in the early 
retirement age would be more adverse to lower- than higher-income 
people when viewed at a point in time.
A study by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine (2015) finds that taking into account differences in life 
expectancy by income quintile, workers at even the lowest income 
quintile would receive higher expected present value of lifetime 
Social Security benefits by postponing receipt of benefits from age 
62 to 64. This result arises because the increase in annual benefits 
with postponement is more than actuarially fair. Thus, a policy that 
raises the early retirement age to 63 with workers receiving the cur-
rent increase in benefits with postponed retirement would on average 
raise both benefit levels and costs for Social Security. It should be 
noted that maximizing the wealth value of Social Security benefits is 
not the goal of individuals whose claiming age is tied to their retire-
Table	4.2		Life	Expectancy	at	Age	65	(expected	years	of	life	remaining),		
by	Lifetime	Earnings,	Males,	Select	Years,	1977–2006
Year 
Bottom half of lifetime 
earnings distribution
Top half of lifetime  
earnings distribution
1977 14.8 15.5
1987 15.3 17.5
1997 15.7 19.6
2006 16.1 21.5
Difference 1977–2006 1.3 6.0
SOURCE: Waldron (2007).
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ment. Rather, individuals seek to maximize their expected lifetime 
utility, which also takes into account the value of leisure that results 
from retiring and receiving Social Security benefits at an earlier age, 
and the disutility (or utility) from an unpleasant (or psychologically 
rewarding) job.
LONGEVITY POLICY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
Social Security policy would be improved by explicitly taking 
into account the increase in life expectancy over time, rather than 
doing so on an ad hoc basis. Social Security currently does not have a 
policy for dealing with the effects on its financing of increases in life 
expectancy. Even if Social Security were not projected to have insuf-
ficient funds based on current life expectancy, with the current benefit 
formula, which does not take into account demographic changes, con-
tinued increases in life expectancy would cause an insufficiency to 
occur in the future. Therefore, a practical reform proposal to maintain 
Social Security’s solvency arguably should include an adjustment of 
Social Security for rising longevity. 
With a longevity policy, all fixed ages in the Social Security pro-
gram—the early retirement age, the normal retirement age, the age at 
which survivors benefits and spousal benefits can be received, and the 
age at which postponement of retirement no longer leads to higher 
benefits would periodically be adjusted upward to take into account 
improvements in life expectancy. In addition, the adjustment of ben-
efits for postponed retirement would be changed to maintain actuarial 
fairness so that lifetime benefits would be the same whether the per-
son took benefits immediately or postponed receipt. 
Indexing	Benefits	
Public policy problems arise when a fixed retirement age is set 
in law, as is traditionally done, because of increases over time in life 
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expectancy. While indexing benefits for changes in prices has long 
been an established practice, indexing benefits for changes in life 
expectancy is only starting to be recognized as a desirable policy 
option. In Sweden, social security benefits are indexed for changes 
in life expectancy, with the generosity of benefits for each new cohort 
of retirees being slightly reduced to take into account the longer time 
period over which the benefits would be received. In the United King-
dom, the earliest age for social security benefit receipt is being raised 
from 65 to 67, with the timing of the raise based on projected improve-
ments in life expectancy, which might be called quasi-indexing, since 
it is not indexing based on actual changes in life expectancy but based 
on expected changes.
Normal Retirement Age 
Several policy options exist with respect to raising the normal 
retirement age, which would effectively be a cut in benefits. However, 
in the real world of politics, communicating a more obscure cut in 
benefits, although lacking in transparency, may be a more effective 
way to enable the enactment of needed changes to Social Security. 
However, while people often do not seem to realize it is a benefit 
cut, they object to raising the normal retirement age as if it had an 
effect on the age at which they could retire. Although cutting benefits 
and raising the early retirement age are not popular options, consider-
ations of popular perceptions may increase the chances of the normal 
retirement age making it through the political process into policy.
First, the normal retirement age could be raised on an ad hoc basis 
to a higher age. It was raised in the 1983 amendments to the Social 
Security Act; phased in with a long delay, the normal retirement age 
was raised from 65 to 67 and took full effect for people born in 1960 
or later, who were thus age 23 at the time of the change. Making such 
a policy change with a long lead time is the result of forward-thinking 
policy. It provides the people affected with ample time to adjust their 
work and savings patterns.
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Second, the normal retirement age could be indexed to rise as 
the life expectancy of retirees increases. The 1994–1996 Advisory 
Council on Social Security (1996) included such a measure in its 
recommendations. Doing so would gradually reduce the Social Secu-
rity replacement rate over time. Recognizing the large differences in 
changes in life expectancy between higher- and lower-income retirees, 
this indexing could be based on the improvement for lower-earnings 
retirees. An advantage of this approach is that the changes would be 
known in advance and thus would pose less risk to workers. Third, the 
normal retirement age could remain fixed, with benefits indexed to life 
expectancy, so that benefits gradually decline as longevity rises for 
successive cohorts (Diamond and Orszag 2004). 
Early versus Normal Retirement Age 
Politically, raising the early retirement age seems to be more dif-
ficult than raising the normal retirement age, with some politicians 
and others expressing outrage at the idea. For more than 40 years, 
Social Security’s early retirement age of 62 has been an important 
benchmark for workers considering retiring. To allow workers ample 
time to adjust their plans, if the eligibility age for Social Security 
were raised to 63, such a change would presumably occur with a long 
delay, possibly 20 years, and with a phase-in period.1 
Comparing an increase in the early retirement age with an increase 
in the normal retirement age, instead of raising the early retirement 
age, the benefits receivable at that age could be reduced. Thus, raising 
the normal retirement age would have the advantage of preserving the 
option for people to continue taking benefits at the early age if they 
were willing to accept the penalty of reduced benefits. 
If everyone were rational economic decision makers, raising the 
normal retirement age would be a better policy than raising the early 
retirement age. The disadvantage of this approach, however, is that 
some people take benefits at the earliest age, seemingly because they 
view that age as acceptable but without assessing the value of post-
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poning benefits. Taking benefits at age 62 not only reduces the ben-
efits of the primary worker and spouse, it also reduces the survivor’s 
benefits. 
Thus, the comparison of benefit cuts versus early retirement age 
increases depends at least in part on the assessment of how many 
people take benefits at age 62 because of myopia or their viewing it as 
the default age, rather than making a rational decision as to that being 
their best age for claiming benefits. 
Precedents 
Raising the early retirement age is a policy that can be supported 
by historical precedent both in the United States and internationally. 
In 1940 when Social Security first paid benefits, the earliest age at 
which workers could receive benefits was age 65. For more than 20 
years, the earliest age at which men could receive Social Security 
benefits remained at 65. In 1961, the early retirement age for men 
was reduced to 62. The reduction for women had occurred five years 
earlier, in 1956. 
An early retirement age of 63 has many international precedents. 
In Germany, for example, the early retirement age is 63 for people 
with 35 years of work and 65 for those with fewer years, both ages 
gradually rising over time. In the United Kingdom, it is currently 65 
for men, with the age being raised over time to 65 for women, and 
both ages being increased to 67. In Switzerland it is 65 for men and 63 
for women. In New Zealand, it is 65. In Ireland, it is 66 (Turner 2007).
The Nature of Work 
The nature of work has considerably changed over time for U.S. 
workers. They have experienced a long-term trend away from physi-
cally demanding jobs, as jobs have switched in turn from agriculture 
to manufacturing, then to the service industry and to the knowledge 
sector. For example, between 1992 and 2002, both men and women 
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workers aged 55–60 saw slight declines in the percent who reported 
jobs that required substantial physical effort most of the time. The 
decline was from 20 to 19 percent for men and from 21 to 17 percent 
for women (Johnson 2004). 
Some 62-year-olds are in poor health, and others have difficult 
job situations. For these people, continuing to work to age 63 may be 
difficult or impossible. Some people are counting the days until they 
reach age 62 and they can retire and take Social Security benefits. 
Others were laid off in their early sixties or late fifties and face age 
discrimination in trying to find another job. 
A Reform Package 
A reform that raised the early retirement age should be part of a 
package that addresses these concerns. A policy of raising the early 
retirement age would have less of a negative impact on older workers 
if it were part of a package to strengthen work options for older Amer-
icans (Chen and Turner 2007; Ghilarducci and Turner 2007). For peo-
ple in poor health, Social Security offers disability benefits. As part 
of a reform that raised the early retirement age, the requirements for 
qualifying for disability benefits at age 62 could be loosened. 
What about people in physically demanding jobs? The percent-
age of workers in those types of occupations has declined consid-
erably over time. Some of those workers are covered by pension 
plans. For example, mine workers, steel workers, and auto workers 
generally belong to unions. Their jobs provide a pension, and they 
could retire and use their pension to help finance their living expenses 
until age 63. For people who were laid off in their early sixties, a 
reform that provided special unemployment benefits starting at age 
62 could be part of a Social Security reform package. A government 
campaign to reduce age discrimination in employment at older ages 
could also be part of a reform package. In addition, the package could 
include increased resources for job retraining of older workers. Thus, 
a reform that raises the early retirement age should include programs 
that would offset the hardship that it causes for some people. 
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Policy Evaluation 
One approach to evaluating an increase in the early retirement 
age is to estimate how many people would be adversely affected by 
such a change. From an insurance perspective, everyone would be 
adversely affected because they would lose the insurance aspect of 
having the option of retiring early, even if it turned out that they did 
not need it. A different, and arguably better, approach than this cross-
sectional approach, which is based on the effect on the population at 
a point in time, is one that looks at the cross-section over time. Thus, 
the question is not, how many people would be adversely affected 
by raising the early retirement age? The better question is, compared 
to 1990 (or some point in the past), would more people be adversely 
affected by an early retirement age of 63 now than were adversely 
affected by an early retirement age of 62 in the past? That compari-
son of cross-sectional equity in an intergenerational framework is an 
arguably better comparison because it puts the comparison in the his-
torical context of intergenerational equity. For example, it could be 
framed as whether an early retirement age of 63 in the future would 
adversely affect more people than did an early retirement age of 62 
for our parents or grandparents.
Changes in lifetime Social Security benefits and changes in 
annual benefits both have policy and welfare implications. Changes in 
lifetime benefits affect the wealth value of Social Security. Changes 
in annual benefits more directly relate to measures of the adequacy 
of Social Security, such as the replacement rate and the poverty rate. 
These changes can be viewed from different perspectives. 
When taking the societal perspective and viewed over time, with 
no change in Social Security, including no change in annual benefits, 
lifetime benefits increase over time because of the increase in life 
expectancy. This change occurs both for high- and low-income work-
ers because life expectancy has increased over time for both groups. 
Both annual benefits and lifetime benefits could be maintained if the 
Social Security early retirement age were increased over time to off-
set the effect of increases in life expectancy on lifetime benefits. 
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Fairness to Low-Income Workers 
Low-income workers have on average a shorter life expectancy 
than high-income workers, and thus an increase in the early retire-
ment age constitutes a greater percentage decline in their years in 
retirement than it does for high-income workers. This argument views 
the change at a point in time, rather than in the broader framework 
that includes considering changes in life expectancy over time. Econ-
omists have generally moved from point-in-time analyses to life cycle 
analyses.
Under a life cycle analysis, when the worker begins work, say 
at age 22, the worker has an expectation of a future Social Security 
benefit. When the worker retires more than 40 years later, the value 
of the promised benefit he or she receives has increased considerably, 
owing to the increase in life expectancy that has occurred over that 
40-year period. Raising the early retirement age to take into account 
that increase in life expectancy would not constitute a reduction in 
lifetime benefits from the perspective of the worker beginning work; 
it would merely offset the increase due to rising life expectancy over 
the period. 
Addressing the issue of cross-sectional equity, a simulation study 
has examined the distributional effects on people of raising the Social 
Security early retirement age from 62 to 65 (Mermin and Steuerle 
2007). That study finds that workers in all income quintiles would 
receive lower lifetime Social Security benefits. However, workers 
in the lowest income quintile are least affected as a group, in part 
because a higher percentage of them receive Social Security disability 
benefits. 
Bosworth, Burtless, and Zhang (2016) argue that the early retire-
ment age should not be increased in line with the increase in average 
life expectancy because of the large difference between the increase 
in life expectancy for the bottom half of the income distribution as 
compared to the top half. As noted in Table 4.2, life expectancy for 
men has increased considerably more for those in the top half of the 
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lifetime earnings distribution, compared to the bottom half. For the 
bottom half, life expectancy at age 65 increased by 1.3 years for the 
29 years between 1977 and 2006. Consider a proposal that would 
raise the early retirement age to 63 in 20 years. Thus, even for those 
in the bottom half of the lifetime earnings distribution, that proposal 
would involve an increase in the early retirement age that was less 
than half the increase in life expectancy.
FLEXIBLE NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE 
Increasing the normal retirement age while holding the early 
retirement age fixed would reduce Social Security’s benefit costs. 
A possible policy to maintain replacement rates is to raise the early 
retirement age to offset the effect of benefit cuts on annual benefits. A 
flexible normal retirement age is an alternative policy that could pre-
serve or even enhance the progressivity of Social Security benefits. 
Social Security policy could use the AIME to target policies that are 
more equitable for people with both lower lifetime income and lower 
life expectancy. However, while life expectancy is strongly correlated 
with AIME for men, it is only weakly correlated for women, and 
when pooling the genders the correlation disappears (Monk, Turner, 
and Zhivan 2010). 
Alternatively, targeting could be done by the max AIME, which 
is the AIME for single persons and the maximum of the husband’s or 
wife’s AIME for married couples. Monk, Turner, and Zhivan (2010) 
find that the max AIME, which is a household measure of lifetime 
income, could be used for constructing a flexible normal retirement 
age because it is negatively correlated with mortality risk and also 
negatively correlated with other measures of economic vulnerability 
or inability to work at older ages. With a flexible normal retirement 
age, individuals in households with a low max AIME would have a 
lower normal retirement age than other individuals. This policy pro-
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vides one way of dealing with the large differences in life expectancy 
by level of income.
Framing
One policy option that derives from the insights of behavioral 
economics has to do with the framing of different ages at which ben-
efits can be claimed. The Social Security Administration uses the 
concept of the normal retirement age or full retirement age, but this 
concept has little to no economic content. Continued work or post-
ponement of benefit receipt past that age results in further increases 
in benefits up to age 70. Nonetheless, some people appear to be con-
fused by the normal retirement age, with a bunching of retirements 
at that age suggesting that there is something “normal” about retiring 
at that age. Dropping that concept, or instead calling age 70 the full 
retirement age, would have no effect on the calculation of benefits, 
but it could result in some people working longer and would reduce 
confusion.
Raising the Number of Years Counted in the Calculation of 
Social	Security	Benefits
Currently, 35 years of work are counted in the calculation of 
Social Security benefits. People who work longer careers must still 
pay the Social Security payroll tax, but they receive no benefit for 
years outside the 35 counted in the benefit calculation. This cap on 
countable years of work provides a disincentive to working a long 
career and is counter in its effect to the goal of encouraging people to 
postpone retirement ages. 
This problem can be dealt with in different ways. First, work-
ers who have worked 35 years since age 21 and who are 62 or older 
could be exempt from paying the Social Security payroll tax. Since 
there may be an advantage to some workers in dropping out low-
earnings years in the benefit calculation because those years would 
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reduce their AIMEs, it might be better to have the payroll tax end after 
38 years of covered work. Second, the number of years counted could 
be extended to, say, 38. This approach could adversely affect some 
women, who tend to have shorter working careers than men because 
they are more likely to take time off from paid work to care for chil-
dren. To the extent that those women receive benefits based on their 
husband’s earnings, rather than their own, they would not be affected 
by this change, so this point may not be particularly strong. Counting 
more years in the benefit formula would reduce benefits because the 
extra years would be years of lower earnings. Third, the benefit for-
mula could be changed so that workers would build up credits toward 
benefits, and they would receive credits for each year worked. This 
approach involves the most dramatic change in the way benefits are 
calculated, but it also appears to be the best approach in terms of both 
fairness and incentives.
An alternative would give credit for all work above 38 years 
through a new benefit, with no change in the current benefit formula. 
This proposal would create a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) 
system for work above 38 years. With an NDC system, each worker 
working more than 38 years would have a notional account to which 
his payroll tax payments would be credited. Each worker would be 
given interest credit on the account, so although the account would 
appear to be similar to an individual pension account, it would be 
unfunded. This approach would provide credit for long careers, but 
with no change in the existing benefit formula. The extra taxes they 
paid would be credited to the NDC system, so they would not be 
penalized as they currently are for long careers. A variant of this pol-
icy could be to have funded rather than notional individual accounts, 
with the accounts invested in the Thrift Savings Plan, which is the 
401(k)-type plan for federal government workers.
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CONCLUSIONS
A number of different aspects of Social Security policy with 
respect to retirement age have been discussed in this chapter. Retire-
ment age policy affects benefit adequacy, the fairness of the distribu-
tion of benefits, and the cost of providing Social Security benefits. 
Increases in life expectancy have raised the cost of lifetime benefits. 
One policy option for Social Security would be to develop an explicit 
policy dealing with the effects on Social Security of increasing life 
expectancy. Raising the early retirement age to 63 should be done 
with a long lead time and a phase-in period.
Raising the early retirement age is a policy that can be supported 
by historical precedent in the United States. In 1940, when Social 
Security first paid benefits, the earliest age at which workers could 
receive benefits was age 65, and it remained that way for more than 
20 years. In 1961, the early retirement age for men was reduced to 
62. The reduction for women had occurred five years earlier, in 1956. 
Note
 1.  See Turner (2007) for international experience with such a policy.
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Chapter 5
Reforming the Reform Process 
Neither Medicare nor Social Security can sustain projected long-
run program costs in full under currently scheduled financing, and 
legislative changes are necessary to avoid disruptive consequences 
for beneficiaries and taxpayers. If lawmakers take action sooner 
rather than later, more options and more time will be available to 
phase in changes so that the public has adequate time to prepare. 
Earlier action will also help elected officials minimize adverse 
impacts on vulnerable populations, including lower-income work-
ers and people already dependent on program benefits.
—Social Security Trustees (2014)
To do nothing is within the power of all men.
—Samuel Johnson (1709–1784)
As the Social Security Trustees have emphasized in their annual 
reports for more than a decade, Social Security should be reformed as 
quickly as possible because needed reforms are less drastic if they are 
done without further delay. In 2015, Congress made a few technical 
reforms to Social Security—it dealt with the impending shortfall of 
the Disability Insurance trust fund but did not address Social Secu-
rity’s financing problems. The 2015 Social Security reforms were a 
missed opportunity by Congress. Realistically, under the current sys-
tem of policymaking, Social Security reform done years before a cri-
sis is not likely to happen. 
KICKING THE CAN DOWN THE ROAD
Given that Congress has a long tradition of kicking the can down 
the road when it comes to Social Security reform, this chapter dis-
cusses two approaches for reforming the Social Security reform pro-
cess. First, it considers automatic adjustment mechanisms, such as 
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those that were adopted in Sweden. Second, it applies the concept of 
defaults to deal with inertia in Congress concerning enacting Social 
Security policy to restore solvency. That proposal is based on experi-
ence in Canada and Japan with policies that help maintain the sol-
vency of social security in those countries. 
This chapter presents a measure of policy inertia that we use to 
compare inertia across countries and examines policy in Canada and 
Japan that provides lessons concerning our proposal for the use of 
defaults. The chapter also discusses the option of automatic policy 
adjustments, which has been enacted by about a dozen countries. 
While Social Security reform traditionally has been framed as the 
choice between the unpopular changes of tax increases and benefit 
cuts, from the perspective of the costs of policy inertia, a benefit of 
Social Security reform is that it resolves the uncertainty people face 
about what their future benefits and taxes will be. 
POLICY INERTIA: COSTS AND CAUSES
Policy inertia is the failure to change public policy in the face 
of incentives or the future necessity to do so. Although it has been 
known for considerably more than a decade that Social Security is 
insufficiently funded for the long run, Congress has not made a sin-
gle substantial change to address this issue. The goal of responsible 
policy making ideally would have provided the incentive for action. 
Because the need for change is not immediate, and because the prob-
lem can be solved only with unpopular changes, politicians are hesi-
tant to take action. 
The longer the delay in enacting reform, the larger the tax increase 
or benefit cut—the changes would be spread over fewer cohorts of 
workers, and there is less time for interest to accumulate. If delayed to 
the last moment, the required increase in the payroll tax rate—if that 
were the sole change—would be 4.4 percent compared to an increase 
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of 2.7 percent had the problem been addressed 20 years earlier (Com-
mittee for a Responsible Federal Budget 2013). 
Policy inertia concerning Social Security is not due to a lack of 
awareness of the problem, nor is it due to a lack of awareness of the 
consequences of delay. As the statement by the Social Security Trust-
ees cited above indicates, policy experts have been arguing for a need 
to address the issue of Social Security solvency on a timely basis.
The policy uncertainty relating to Social Security is one of the 
largest sources of policy uncertainty for American workers (Luttmer 
and Samwick 2015). It makes it more difficult for workers to plan how 
much they need to save for retirement and when they can afford to 
retire. Workers have limited ability to insure against these policy risks 
and thus can mitigate them only by engaging in costly precaution-
ary behavior in the form of increased savings and postponed planned 
retirement. Since those activities are difficult for many workers, they 
face the risk of having a diminished standard of living in retirement. 
The life cycle model in economics argues that workers wish to 
smooth their consumption over time. Social Security policy inertia 
makes it difficult for them to do that. Luttmer and Samwick (2015) 
empirically analyze the magnitude of these effects, concluding that 
American workers on average would be willing to accept a 4–6 per-
cent benefit cut if that would remove the policy uncertainty. 
Policy inertia and the resulting insufficiency of Social Security’s 
funding may contribute to a lack of confidence in Social Security. The 
EBRI Retirement Confidence Survey in 2015 finds that 19 percent of 
people aged 25–69 believe they will get nothing from Social Secu-
rity, presumably because of its inadequate financing. That figure is up 
from 10 percent in 1991 (EBRI 2015). 
Policy inertia is also costly to the federal government. Since 
2010, Social Security’s benefit payments have exceeded its payroll 
tax receipts (plus taxes paid on Social Security benefits), causing 
Social Security to have a negative effect on the government’s cash 
flow (Congressional Budget Office 2015a).
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The consequences for such inaction are serious. The last major 
policy changes to Social Security, in 1983, were made in a crisis at the 
last moment, with only weeks to spare before benefit payments would 
be delayed because of insufficient funds (Light 2005). The same thing 
nearly happened with the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, which was 
scheduled to have insufficient money in 2016 but was saved by a 
short-term fix in 2015. As of 2016, with 18 years to financial insuf-
ficiency, the next reform of Social Security OASI may also occur at 
the last moment. The reform process isn’t working.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
The concept of inertia has been used in the context of lack of 
change by 401(k) participants in their participation or lack of par-
ticipation in 401(k) plans (Choi et al. 2002; Madrian and Shea 2001; 
Muller and Turner 2013). Turner and Klein (2016) discuss policy 
inertia in the context of the benefit eligibility age for Social Secu-
rity and the Military Retirement System. They note that policy inertia 
with respect to adjusting those benefit eligibility ages is considerably 
greater in the United States than in several other countries.
Hoskins (2010) discusses whether the use of the 75-year projec-
tion period for evaluating Social Security financing is a factor in pol-
icy inertia in the United States. He notes that the United States is an 
outlier with respect to the length of its actuarial projections, with Ger-
many requiring projections of 15 years, and several European coun-
tries, including France, requiring projections of 30–40 years. Japan, 
however, uses actuarial projections of 95 years. He raises the ques-
tion of whether a shorter time horizon might result in more frequent 
reforms in some countries. 
The idea that Social Security reform must achieve adequate 
funding for 75 years and beyond raises the hurdle as to the type of 
changes that policy analysts consider to be acceptable. For example, 
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Brandon (2014) presents potential Social Security fixes but focuses 
entirely on fixes required to return solvency for the 75-year horizon. A 
shorter projection period would presumably facilitate reform because 
reforms could be made in smaller increments. 
One measure of the adequacy of Social Security’s financing is its 
annual cost ratio. The Social Security annual cost ratio is the ratio of 
the cost of the program, mainly benefit payments, to taxable payroll. 
Because the long-run trend of the cost ratio is upward, reforms for 
longer time periods must involve larger changes. Reforms for shorter 
time periods can be incremental.
POLICY INERTIA: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Although no major changes have been made in Social Security 
since 1983, a measure of policy inertia that is comparable across 
countries is the number of years since the early retirement age was 
changed. Since 1961, the early retirement age for men in the United 
States has been 62. Many countries have raised the benefit eligibility 
age for social security because of increasing longevity. Table 5.1 pro-
vides the date of the last change in the benefit eligibility age for social 
security pension in selected countries. The sample of countries is a 
convenience sample and thus is not a representative selection of a sci-
entifically selected population. Nonetheless, it provides examples of 
a number of countries, many of which are similar in important ways 
to the United States. Using that table, policy inertia can be measured 
as the number of years since a change in the benefit eligibility age, 
with 2015 being the base year. With the exception of China, which 
has announced its intention to raise the benefit eligibility age in the 
near future, the United States has the highest measure of policy inertia 
among these countries. For example, while it was 54 years since the 
benefit eligibility age was raised in the United States (as of 2015), it 
was 28 years since the benefit eligibility age was raised in Canada. 
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One possible explanation for the high degree of inertia in the United 
States compared to the other countries in Table 5.1 is that all the other 
democracies listed in the table have parliamentary governments. 
Political commentators argue that a weakness of the presidential form 
of government is political gridlock (Brady and Volden 2006). With a 
parliamentary government, when the ruling party has a majority in 
Parliament, it is relatively easy to pass legislation that the prime min-
ister wants. That would be similar to a situation where the president 
and the majority party in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate are from the same party, which is relatively uncommon in the 
current era in which the Democrats and Republicans are relatively 
equal in electoral strength. 
AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS
Reforms are much easier to enact when benefits are being raised 
than when benefits are being cut. In the age of social security retrench-
ment, some countries have adopted automatic adjustment mecha-
Table	5.1		Year	of	Last	Change	in	Social	Security	Benefit	Eligibility	Age,	
Selected	Countries,	2015
Country
Year of last change  
in social security  
benefit eligibility age
Inertia index: 2015  
(average number of years 
since last change for social 
security pensions)
United States 1961 54
China 1951 64
Canada 1987 28
Sweden 1998 17
Ireland 2015  0
Poland 2015  0
France 2015  0
United Kingdom 2015 (women only)  0
SOURCE: Turner and Klein (2016).
Reforming the Reform Process   75
nisms because of the difficulty the political system has in enacting 
unpopular reforms. These mechanisms automatically change the 
social security program parameters in a predetermined way, depend-
ing on economic and demographic developments. For example, these 
policies decide in advance how Social Security will be reformed to 
deal with the added costs resulting from life expectancy increases. 
Automatic adjustment mechanisms address the interrelated problems 
of social security sustainability; the political difficulty for politi-
cians of reforms that involve retrenchment; and the political risk to 
workers, retirees, and employers associated with ad hoc social secu-
rity reforms, which are difficult for workers to plan for because the 
changes are not known in advance.
Recognizing the difficulties politicians have in enacting unpopu-
lar reforms during this time of population aging, at least 12 coun-
tries have adopted life expectancy indexing of social security ben-
efits or automatic adjustments tied to an indicator of social security 
insolvency (Turner 2011). Both types of reforms provide automatic 
adjustment mechanisms for sustaining the solvency of social security 
systems and reducing the political risks for workers and beneficiaries. 
Automatic adjustments are generally small, frequent, and predict-
able—all desirable features. Automatic adjustments are transparent. 
It is clear how adjustments will be made and who will bear what costs 
when an adjustment occurs. 
With automatic adjustments to benefits, taxes, or the early or nor-
mal retirement age, increases in life expectancy automatically lead to 
program parameter changes. However, the adjustment mechanisms 
used for indexing can vary.
The differences in automatic adjustment mechanisms can be cat-
egorized in four dimensions: 
 1)  the frequency of the adjustment, 
 2)  the triggering event, 
 3)  whether the trigger is a hard trigger or a soft trigger, and 
 4)  the change that is triggered. 
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First, some automatic adjustments annually test for the need 
for change and make any necessary changes; these adjustments are 
designed as part of the ongoing financing to maintain the solvency 
of a system. For example, life expectancy indexing of initial benefits 
generally is done annually, as in Sweden, but Italy adjusts benefits 
every three years. 
Second, the social security system’s choice of triggering event 
varies. Some adjustments are tied to the system’s underlying econom-
ics and demographics, such as changes in life expectancy, the old-age 
dependency ratio, or real wages. Others are tied to a measure of the 
insolvency of the system, and adjustments are made only if the sys-
tem is judged not to be fully solvent over the long run. 
Third, the trigger can be a “soft” trigger, meaning that the gov-
ernment must do something to resolve the problem but may choose 
among different measures. Alternatively, it can be a “hard” trigger, 
meaning that the government’s adjustment is predetermined and 
automatic (Penner and Steuerle 2007). In most countries that adopt 
automatic adjustment mechanisms, the trigger is a hard trigger if the 
adjustment involves life expectancy indexing of benefits. However, 
triggers tied to a measure of insolvency are generally soft triggers, 
with some degree of political involvement in the process. Even in 
Sweden, which has a hard trigger with respect to insolvency, the gov-
ernment maintains oversight, so the automatic adjustment may be 
overridden. 
Fourth, the change that is triggered can be an adjustment in tax 
rates, benefits, retirement ages, or some combination. 
In the past, the United States has made ad hoc reforms to main-
tain the solvency of Social Security. Ad hoc reforms require elected 
officials to enact legislation each time an adjustment to social security 
financing is needed. These reforms have a high degree of political 
risk for workers because their timing and magnitude are unknown 
in advance. While it is often argued that Social Security benefits 
are less subject to risk than are benefits financed through individual 
accounts, the political risk workers face due to ad hoc reforms can be 
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sizable. The distributional consequences across workers are unknown 
in advance and depend on whether benefits are cut, taxes raised, or 
both. Because of the political difficulty in legislating cutbacks in 
social security programs, ad hoc reforms tend to occur in a crisis, 
with little advance notice to workers and retirees as to the legislated 
changes. They thus may create hardships for workers nearing retire-
ment, who are facing less generous Social Security benefits than they 
had planned for. 
Automatic adjustment mechanisms can eliminate the need for 
large program changes negotiated in a crisis. They can greatly reduce 
the risk of insufficient financing, but they, however, do not eliminate 
all risk. Workers still face the risk that benefit levels may be reduced, 
taxes raised, or retirement ages moved back. Risk is reduced in that 
workers know under what circumstances such changes will occur. 
Political risk may be reduced with automatic adjustment mechanisms, 
but it is generally not eliminated, as politicians can always intercede 
and modify the changes that were designed to be automatic—this has 
happened in Sweden and Germany. In Sweden, the financial crisis and 
recession led to a decline in the value of accumulated contribution 
surpluses held in buffer funds that was expected to lead to a reduction 
in benefits in 2010. This step was avoided when a multiparty working 
group agreed to a change in the social security law that would base 
the activation of the automatic balancing trigger on buffer fund bal-
ances (formerly a single year) to a three-year average (Bosworth and 
Weaver 2011). As a consequence, future benefit cuts resulting from 
swings in fund balances would be moderated.
In Sweden, with the automatic balancing mechanism to maintain 
solvency, if the growth rate of real per capita wages is constant at 
1.6 percent per year, the social security benefit is adjusted solely by 
changes in the CPI. If the annual growth rate of real per capita wage 
income falls below 1.6 percent, however, the cost of living adjustment 
is less than the increase in the CPI, and if the growth rate of real per 
capita wage income exceeds 1.6 percent, the adjustment is greater 
than the CPI. For example, if the annual growth rate in real per capita 
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wages were 1.5 percent, the increase in benefits in payment would be 
0.1 percent less than the rate of growth of the CPI.
Real per capita wage growth in Sweden has averaged about 2 
percent over long periods (Palmer 2000). Because this average rate 
exceeds the rate of 1.6 percent in the adjustment formula, over time 
this indexing of benefits is expected to be more generous than price 
indexing based on the growth in the CPI. Thus, Swedish pensioners 
share with workers in the fluctuations and the long-term growth of 
the economy. However, in an economic recession, indexed benefits 
of Swedish pensioners will be lower than the level provided by price 
indexing, resulting in a reduction in real (price indexed) benefits.
Weaver and Willén (2014) conclude, after studying the Swedish 
social security reform of the late 1990s, that reform may be easier to 
enact when it is complex and opaque and thus not well understood 
by the electorate. They also argue that automatic adjustment mecha-
nisms are likely to be effective when the adjustments are small and 
done frequently, so that their effects are less noticeable. The Swedish 
experience also indicates that politicians are unlikely to accept auto-
matic adjustments that involve cuts in nominal benefits, which were 
overridden by the Swedish parliament.
Automatic adjustment mechanisms, however, while a step in the 
right direction toward maintaining sustainability, are themselves not 
necessarily financially sustainable. If they are not consistent with the 
fundamental principles of sustainability explained in Chapter 2 they 
will eventually need to have further adjustments. 
POLICY LESSONS FROM JAPAN AND CANADA
Japan 
In Japan, a special commission reviews the social security pro-
grams every five years. While reforms are not a mandatory outcome 
of this review process, that is the expectation and the tradition in 
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Japan (Liu 2000). Thus, historically, Japan has had relatively fre-
quent, incremental reforms, which arguably are easier to enact than 
infrequent, major reforms. The current reality, however, is more com-
plex. With population aging increasing the difficulty of reforms, more 
recently, Hayashi (2012) argues that in the face of unpopular needed 
reforms and the lack of an institutional requirement for reform, the 
Japanese government has a history of inertia. 
Canada 
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) is Canada’s social security pro-
gram, except for the Province of Quebec, which maintains a similar 
but separate plan. The CPP is designed so that an established fund is 
expected to be adequate to cover the retirement of the Canadian baby 
boom and the aging of the population. There likely will not be a need 
for further contribution rate increases or benefit cuts over the next 
75 years. However, a prolonged period of adverse financial markets, 
or other economic or demographic changes that are adverse to the 
solvency of the fund, could result in the need for changes to maintain 
solvency. 
Every three years, the CPP’s chief actuary evaluates the finan-
cial sustainability of the system. If the chief actuary determines that 
the system is not financially sustainable for the following 75 years, 
legislation passed in 1997 requires an automatic adjustment (Ameri-
can Academy of Actuaries 2002). The automatic adjustment occurs, 
however, only if the Canadian parliament cannot first decide on an 
adjustment, which is considered to be unlikely. The automatic adjust-
ment freezes benefits for three years and increases the contribution 
rate in a single step for three years, until the next triennial evaluation 
of the fund. So far, insufficient funding has not been projected, so this 
mechanism has not been called upon.
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THE PREDICTABLE CRISIS
Social Security policy making can be analyzed as a Tobit prob-
lem, similar to the purchase of a car, which also tends to be done 
infrequently and as a major purchase. The essence of the Tobit prob-
lem is that there is a relatively high hurdle for a minimum change, 
and for that reason change is made infrequently. In the case of Social 
Security, the high hurdle is the tradition that changes need to restore 
solvency for 75 years. 
A major difference from the typical Tobit problem, such as pur-
chasing a car, is that the longer Congress waits, the more expensive 
is the action required. Delay raises the hurdle for policy change by 
increasing the required level of benefit cuts or tax increases. This 
effect raises the likelihood of Social Security changes being made 
due to a crisis. Congress does not deal with the problem until a crisis 
forces politicians to act. 
CHANGING CHOICE ARCHITECTURE TO OVERCOME 
POLICY INERTIA: USE OF DEFAULTS
An insight of behavioral economics is the use of defaults to 
overcome the inertia people sometimes experience and to result in 
desirable outcomes for them when otherwise they would not make 
a change. Inertia as a reason for workers not enrolling for pension 
coverage has been addressed by autoenrollment, where the default is 
that workers are automatically enrolled to participate in a 401(k)-type 
plan. For example, autoenrollment has been used in the Thrift Sav-
ings Plan for federal government workers as a way to increase the 
participation rate. 
Inertia has been addressed in other contexts by the use of defaults. 
As explained in the previous section, defaults are used in Canada as 
part of their system for maintaining solvency of their social security 
Reforming the Reform Process   81
program. That approach could be used to deal with inertia in U.S. 
Social Security policy.
Choice architecture refers to the way choices are framed. In 
Social Security policy, choices are framed as requiring action by Con-
gress that restores solvency for Social Security for at least 75 years. 
The default for Social Security policy is that no action is taken until a 
crisis forces Congress to act. Social Security policy changes are made 
infrequently, generally in response to a crisis, and tend to be major 
changes. 
My proposal has three parts: 1) the basic framework, 2) an exam-
ple of a default reform proposal, and 3) a strategy for enacting the 
proposal. 
The Basic Framework 
The essential aspect of the proposal is that Congress makes a 
binding commitment to not let the date of Social Security insolvency 
be less than 15 years away. With this proposal, every time the inter-
mediate projection of the Social Security actuaries indicates that there 
is insufficient financing for the next 15 years, Congress will be given 
one year to restore solvency for the following 20 years. If Congress 
fails to act within that time frame, automatic changes would restore 
solvency for 20 years. The package would involve several changes 
to Social Security, thus minimizing the effect of any single change. 
Because the changes are made years in advance, rather than at the last 
moment, and because they restore solvency for 20 years rather than 
75 years, they would be smaller than would otherwise be necessary. 
This proposal addresses inertia in part by lowering the hurdle so 
that reforms would be done as a series of relatively small reforms. 
Because the changes would be made 15 years in advance of the crisis 
instead of at the last minute, and because the requirement would be 
that Social Security would be solvent for 20 years rather than 75, the 
required changes would be considerably smaller. 
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The Default Reform
Solvency could be restored by equal measures of financing 
increases and benefit cuts. Luttmer and Samwick (2015) find that 
more than half of American workers (58 percent) expect that Social 
Security reform will involve both financing increases and benefit cuts, 
while 18 percent think that reform will mostly or entirely involve ben-
efit cuts, and 24 percent think that it will mostly or entirely involve 
revenue increases. Thus, such a reform would be consistent with what 
the majority of Americans expect.
Under this reform proposal, financing increases would be divided 
equally between an increase in the maximum earnings subject to the 
payroll tax and an increase in the payroll tax rate. The benefit cuts 
would occur through an increase for future retirees in the normal 
retirement age and a six-month delay in the cost-of-living adjustment. 
While these changes appear to be balanced and reasonable, they are 
not ideal; rather, they provide Congress an incentive to make changes 
that it views are superior.
For the first time, Congress would be required to maintain its 
solvency, which could improve public confidence in Social Security. 
Under this proposal, solvency would be maintained through a series 
of small changes, unless Congress decided instead to make major 
changes. Social Security would be solvent for at least 15 years, and 
Social Security reforms would no longer be in a crisis mode, as they 
were in 1983.
This reform proposal would result in a different, arguably better, 
distribution of burden across generations than would a reform pro-
posal that was enacted at the last minute. It would result in a more 
even sharing of burden across a larger number of cohorts. For this 
reason, it would provide a more equitable distribution of the burden 
across generations.
The last cohort of the baby boom generation was born in 1964 
and thus turns 62 in 2026. If a reform occurred at the last moment, and 
if it did not affect the benefits of those already age 62, then the entire 
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baby boom generation would be spared from bearing the burden of 
the reform, with the costs of the reform shifted to their children. By 
contrast, if the reform were done in 2016, a decade earlier, then tax 
hikes and benefit cuts would be borne by roughly half of the baby 
boom generation. Thus, this proposal would result in an arguably 
better intergenerational distribution of reform costs than a long-term 
reform done at the last minute.
Enacting the Proposal 
The “save more tomorrow” concept means that people commit 
today to do something in the future (Benartzi and Thaler 2004). It 
is easier to commit to doing something in the future that a person 
is not inclined to do than actually taking that action in the present. 
By enacting this proposal in 2016, Congress would be committing to 
take action in 2020, according to the current Social Security Trustees 
report. 
Financial Literacy and Social Security Reform 
Ultimately, Congress is not acting on Social Security reform 
because no one is putting pressure on Congress to do so. Thus, this 
proposal has one additional part. 
Financial literacy is of limited use for most people if they do not 
have a good idea of what their Social Security benefits will be. The 
Social Security Administration sends out projected benefit statements 
to people every five years—for example, at ages 25, 30, 35. However, 
these statements provide misleading information. They provide pro-
jected benefits based on the benefit formula in the current law. That 
information is misleading because Social Security is inadequately 
funded, and unless there is a reform, by law it will provide benefits 
only at the level that can be paid for—roughly a quarter less. 
Social Security should amend its benefit statement and provide 
not only the current information but also the benefits that will be paid 
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in the absence of reform. This will have two benefits: first, people 
will understand that there is a good chance they will not receive the 
higher level of benefits, and second, this understanding will likely 
cause people to pressure Congress to act. 
This proposal is a second-best solution—it is better than simply 
waiting until a crisis happens. However, a better solution would be for 
Congress to enact a well-reasoned reform many years in advance of 
a crisis. One of the possible benefits of this proposal is that it might 
inspire Congress to take that route.
CONCLUSIONS
Social Security reforms will be less drastic if they are done with-
out further delay; however, under the current system of policy mak-
ing, realistically that is not going to happen. Social Security policy in 
the United States is characterized by a high degree of inertia. 
Inertia has been addressed in other aspects of pension policy 
through defaults. I propose extending that insight to Social Security 
policy making. The essential aspect of the proposal is that Congress 
makes a binding commitment to not let the date of Social Security 
insolvency be less than 15 years away. With the proposal suggested 
in this chapter, every time the Social Security actuaries project that 
Social Security will have insufficient funding within 15 years, a pack-
age of small changes would occur that would restore solvency for 
the following 20 years. The package would involve several changes, 
thus minimizing the effect of any single change. Because the changes 
are made in advance, rather than at the last moment, and because 
they restore solvency for 20 years, rather than 75 years, they would 
be smaller than would otherwise be necessary. Congress would have 
the option to override the default by producing its own package that 
restored solvency for the following 20 years, but if it did not act, the 
default package would automatically take effect.
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This proposal would help restore confidence in Social Security 
by assuring that the system would be solvent for at least 15 years. 
The proposal would also provide for reforms on a more timely basis 
than would otherwise occur. Also, the reforms would be predictable, 
unless Congress overrode them, in which case Congress would pre-
sumably provide reforms that were more politically appealing. 
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Chapter 6
The Way Forward
This book examines options for Social Security reform. It considers 
reforms that would restore solvency and reforms that would improve 
the way benefits are provided in regard to fairness and targeting. The 
book also proposes a reform of the reform process, presents a sustain-
able benefit formula, and argues that the increase in the shadow price 
of Social Security benefits makes an increase in benefits unlikely. It 
focuses on a number of prominent reform options, some that appear 
desirable and some that do not. This final chapter concludes by pre-
senting a vision of the way forward. 
ROADBLOCKS
Policy Inertia: Social Security’s Biggest Problem 
The biggest problem facing Social Security is Congress’s failure 
to deal with its future insolvency. Social Security reform to restore 
solvency could occur in a responsible manner, through a reasoned 
process of political compromise that is done years before the date 
of insolvency—the earlier the reform is enacted, the less drastic the 
required changes will be. 
An important aspect of financial literacy for workers, and thus 
financial advice, is understanding what future Social Security benefits 
will be. However, this is challenging because of the uncertainty about 
the nature and timing of future Social Security reforms. The informa-
tion that the Social Security administration provides in its mailings to 
workers is highly misleading. The benefit projections assume that a 
future reform will provide sufficient revenue so that there will be no 
cuts in future benefits, and the projections do not disclose this key 
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assumption. The disclosures should include projections of benefits 
actually payable in the absence of future reforms. The actual level of 
future benefits presumably lies between those two estimates.
Status Quo Bias 
Social Security reform requires difficult choices. Is it possible to 
enact reform without causing hardship for anyone? A reform package 
likely will involve some combination of benefit cuts (such as rais-
ing the normal retirement age), payroll tax increases (such as raising 
the taxable maximum earnings), and possibly an increase in the early 
retirement age, all of which make people worse off. However, com-
pared to doing nothing, which would result in automatic benefit cuts, 
the reform package is clearly an improvement. False comparisons are 
often made in policy discussions—in this case, if the status quo is 
maintained with no benefit cuts, no payroll tax rate increases, and 
no change in the early retirement age, then it is clear that the reform 
package would result in hardship. That approach could be called sta-
tus quo bias in policy analysis. Any change in Social Security policy 
needs to be evaluated against the policy reform alternatives, rather 
than the status quo. 
OPTIONS FOR A BALANCED REFORM
Social security reforms are usually introduced by countries as 
a package, involving a number of changes implemented simultane-
ously. This book provides suggestions for a balanced reform. Rather 
than needing to restore solvency for 75 years, as has been the goal tra-
ditionally (Diamond and Orszag 2004), the package could be designed 
to restore solvency for a shorter period, such as 20 or 30 years. 
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Revenue Reforms 
Revenue reforms would include a small increase in the payroll 
tax rate and an increase in the taxable maximum earnings ceiling. 
Raising the payroll tax ceiling would bring a higher percentage of 
age-earnings into the Social Security earnings pool. The evidence 
from the increase in the Social Security payroll tax rate following its 
temporary decrease a few years ago suggests that a small increase in 
the payroll tax rate, shared equally by workers and employers, would 
go largely unnoticed if it were part of a reform with bipartisan support. 
The percentage of Social Security benefits that are taxed for 
higher-income retirees could be raised to 100 percent (the percentage 
of benefits subject to tax), which would also have a small effect of 
improving the progressivity of the Social Security program, which 
has been adversely affected by the large increase in life expectancy 
for higher-income retirees relative to lower-income retirees. As it is 
currently, the large difference in mortality between higher- and lower-
income persons is an element that favors higher-income persons in 
the receipt of lifetime benefits.
Another way to raise revenue would be to invest 15 percent of the 
Trust Fund in the stock market. Though currently not in fashion, the 
idea of increasing revenues by investing part of the Social Security 
trust fund in the stock market is an idea that Canada has successfully 
implemented. Any policy analyst considering this idea would only 
need to look to our neighbor for evidence regarding its feasibility.
As was mandated for federal employees in the 1983 reform, all 
new state and local government employees should be covered by 
Social Security. This change would improve Social Security’s financ-
ing in the short run, though in the long run additional benefits would 
need to be paid. This change would make Social Security a truly uni-
versal program, which would be desirable in terms of paying for the 
intergenerational transfers that were made to the first generation that 
suffered through the Great Depression.
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As an added source of revenue, all “lost” 401(k)-type accounts 
would be transferred to the Social Security Administration. The origi-
nal owner of the accounts would not lose his or her rights to those 
accounts and could claim them from Social Security, but it is likely 
that many of the accounts would ultimately revert to the OASI Trust 
Fund.
Benefit	Reforms	
Social Security already provides modest benefits compared to 
the benefit programs of many countries. Retirees, who can do little 
to offset any benefit cuts, would particularly suffer. For that reason, 
Social Security reforms involving benefit cuts should be enacted with 
a lead time. 
One way to increase benefits may be to improve the financial 
literacy of workers as it relates to knowledge about Social Security. 
In particular, some people claim benefits earlier than they otherwise 
would, and therefore receiving lower benefits, because they do not 
understand that postponing benefit receipt leads to increased future 
benefits. Thus, the Social Security Administration may need different 
procedures regarding workers claiming benefits at age 62. A simple 
one would be to call age 62 the early retirement age. In addition, the 
Social Security Administration may need to provide better informa-
tion to early claimants about the value of postponing benefit receipt.
Workers aged 50 and older could also increase their future Social 
Security benefits by making voluntary additional Social Security con-
tributions, called catch-up contributions. They would contribute both 
the employer and employee share of the payroll tax—10.6 percent. 
Thus, for every $10.60 extra that a worker contributed, he would be 
credited for an extra $100 in Social Security earnings for that year, 
with the possibility of crediting up to the payroll tax maximum. The 
payment could be made through regular withholding, if the employer 
agreed, or could be made at the time the worker filed income taxes.
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Workers aged 62 and older who have worked at least 35 years 
could opt to invest their contributions in the Thrift Savings Plan for 
federal government workers, the military, and members of Con-
gress. The Thrift Savings Plan is a low-fee plan (less than three basis 
points), which is like a 401(k). This alternative would allow workers 
to build up funded individual accounts, it would encourage workers to 
keep working, and it could provide a lump sum benefit. The employer 
share of the payroll tax would continue to be paid into the Social 
Security trust fund.
In a time of financing shortfall, where the Social Security benefits 
of some future retirees will likely be reduced, in part to offset those 
reductions, there is a need to increase in a targeted way some of the 
benefits that Social Security provides. On net, these changes will lead 
to a Social Security program that better targets its benefits to those 
who need them, while at the same time retaining it as a universal 
program that benefits nearly all older Americans.
To deal with the sharp increase in poverty that occurs at advanced 
ages, a longevity insurance benefit would be established, providing 
benefits starting at age 82. This would be a relatively inexpensive 
benefit to provide. It could be instituted as part of a reform package 
that otherwise cuts benefits but not for people aged 82 and older. As 
the book documents, Social Security originally was structured like a 
longevity insurance program that only about half of workers survived 
to receive. With improvements in life expectancy and the reduction 
in the age at which benefits can be received—from 65 to 62—Social 
Security is now an earnings-replacement program with a relatively 
small longevity insurance component. 
A minimum benefit could be established for long-career work-
ers with 30 or more years of covered work. This benefit would pro-
vide better retirement income for the working poor. The generosity 
of survivors benefits should be increased, particularly for two-earner 
couples. A single person needs more than half of the income of a mar-
ried couple. Under the current system for a dual-earner couple, Social 
Security benefits can fall by as much as 50 percent after the death of 
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either spouse. Introducing a caregiver’s credit would help women and 
men who take time out of the labor force to care for someone. For 
caregivers not qualifying for spousal benefits, time taken out of the 
labor force reduces their Social Security benefits.
Recognizing that the early retirement age for Social Security orig-
inally was 65, that life expectancy is substantially greater now than in 
1940—even for people with low earnings—and that many countries 
similar to the United States have higher early retirement ages than 
does the United States, the early retirement age would be raised to 
63, beginning with a lag and phased in over time. The increase in the 
early retirement age would not be based on the increase in average 
life expectancy, but rather on the increase in life expectancy for the 
bottom half of the income distribution, which is substantially lower.
Raising the early retirement age would be unfair to people near 
retirement, who had based their savings and working plans on the 
current retirement age of 62. However, raising it with a long lead 
time and a long phase-in would make sense, given the increase in life 
expectancy. In addition, while some people have physically demand-
ing jobs, the percentage in those jobs has declined considerably, so, 
arguably, national retirement age policy should not be based on the 
small percentage of the workforce in those jobs. 
To offset the hardship for some groups that raising the early 
retirement age would cause, the requirements for Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance would be loosened at age 62. In addition, a reform 
could include the following actions:
• Implement a more aggressive program designed to reduce age 
discrimination in employment. 
• Enact a program of job retraining specifically for older workers.
• Make available extended unemployment benefits for those 
aged 62–63. 
• Increase the normal retirement age, beginning with a lag and 
being phased in, with the effect being offset for those with low 
benefits by the minimum benefit.
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Another reform would give credit for all work above 38 years 
through a new benefit. This proposal would create a Notional Defined 
Contribution (NDC) system for work above 38 years. With that sys-
tem, each person working more than 38 years would have a notional 
account to which his payroll tax payments would be credited. The 
employer’s payments would continue to go into the Social Security 
Trust Fund. Each worker would be credited interest on the account, 
so the account would appear to workers to be like an individual pen-
sion account, but with the difference being that the account would be 
unfunded. This approach would provide credit for long careers but 
with no change in the existing benefit formula. The extra taxes they 
paid would be credited to the NDC system, so they would not be 
penalized as they currently are for long careers. 
An alternative to this proposal is that the accounts could be 
invested in the Thrift Savings Plan that currently is available only for 
federal government workers, members of Congress, and the military. 
For example, they could be invested in the target date fund applicable 
for the person’s age. The worker’s contribution would be invested in 
the Thrift Savings Plan, while the employer’s contribution would be 
sent to the Social Security trust fund. This could be a voluntary option 
that workers would be informed about, but that they would need to 
affirmatively choose.
Social Security adjusts benefits for postponed retirement, but 
over time with the increase in life expectancy at older ages, the adjust-
ment for postponed retirement has become overly generous. Those 
persons who are able to postpone retirement generally receive higher 
lifetime benefits. This arrangement disproportionately favors higher-
income persons because they are more likely to postpone retirement 
or to have sufficient resources so that they can retire but postpone 
when they claim Social Security benefits. Thus, a reform that would 
improve the financing of Social Security and its equity would reduce 
the adjustment of benefits for postponed retirement.
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FRAMING OR NAMING REFORMS 
A minor reform that would lead to less confusion about Social 
Security is to rename the FICA tax as the Social Security Payroll tax. 
Other renaming ideas include calling age 62 the early retirement age 
instead of the Social Security retirement age. Similarly, the full or 
normal retirement age, currently age 66, is neither full in terms of 
maximizing benefits nor normal in the statistical sense of most likely. 
Age 70 should replace age 66 as the full retirement age because that 
is when postponing receipt no longer increases benefits. If a longevity 
insurance benefit is added, Social Security Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI) could be renamed Old-Age, Survivors and Longev-
ity Insurance (OASLI).
Automatic Adjustments 
A different approach to Social Security reform that recognizes the 
difficulty of political action during the era of cutbacks involves auto-
matic changes. Congress could pass a law that specifies automatic 
changes that are tied to factors such as improvement in life expec-
tancy and declines in system solvency. At least a dozen countries, 
including Japan, Sweden, and Germany, have adopted this approach. 
A simple automatic adjustment mechanism that would maintain sol-
vency would adjust the normal retirement age upward in line with 
increases in the old-age dependency ratio. Alternatively, the auto-
matic adjustment could involve both revenue increases and benefit 
cuts. Or, automatic adjustments could be tied to increases in the life 
expectancy of people in the bottom half of the income distribution. 
That measure would show a substantially smaller improvement in 
life expectancy than would a measure based on the experience of the 
entire population.
This change would be made to correct for the effect of increased 
longevity and could be part of a policy for Social Security that sys-
tematically adjusted the system to deal with the various effects of 
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increased longevity. A longevity policy for Social Security would 
improve the reform process; it would help maintain Social Security’s 
solvency by making some changes as technical corrections rather 
than as politically divisive changes. With a longevity policy, all fixed 
ages in the Social Security program—the early retirement age, the 
normal retirement age, the age at which survivors benefits and spou-
sal benefits can be received, and the age at which postponement of 
retirement no longer leads to higher benefits would periodically be 
adjusted upward to take into account improvements in life expec-
tancy. In addition, the adjustment of benefits for postponed retirement 
would be changed to maintain actuarial fairness so that lifetime ben-
efits would be the same whether the person took benefits immediately 
or postponed receipt. 
The exact parameters of the changes in the early and normal retire-
ment ages, tax rates, and taxable maximum ceiling would depend on 
when the reform was enacted, with smaller changes being needed the 
sooner the reform is enacted. 
CHANGING POLICY DEFAULTS: A SECOND- 
BEST SOLUTION
Unfortunately, instead of the “ideal” solutions outlined above, 
Social Security reform could occur at the last moment, with the pres-
sure of a crisis forcing politicians to finally act. Recognizing that the 
apparent inability of Congress to act in a timely manner is the big-
gest problem facing Social Security, this book offers an alternative, 
second-best approach for dealing with the reform process.
Using insights from behavioral economics and the power of 
defaults, Congress could pass a law that requires it to take action if 
insolvency is 15 or fewer years away. If it fails to take action within 
one year of that point, automatic changes involving benefit cuts and 
tax increases will occur that will restore solvency for the following 20 
years. The default changes would provide an incentive for Congress 
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to pass its own reform, which would ensure that action is taken on a 
reasonably timely basis, and would also reduce the hurdle in that it 
does not require that solvency be solved for 75 years into the future 
but only for 20. Thus, instead of Social Security reforms being done 
as major reforms at the last minute, this approach would facilitate 
them being done as a series of incremental reforms that can be smaller 
because they are made in advance. 
Ultimately, the reason Congress is not acting on Social Security 
reform is that no one is pressuring it to do so. Thus, this proposal 
has one additional part. The Social Security Administration sends out 
projected benefit statements to people every five years—when they 
reach ages 25, 30, 35, etc. However, these statements provide mis-
leading information—they provide projected benefits based on the 
benefit formula in the current law. It is misleading because Social 
Security is inadequately funded, and unless there is a reform, by law 
it will provide benefits only at the level that can be paid for—roughly 
a quarter less. Social Security should amend its benefit statement and 
provide both the current information and the benefits that will be paid 
in the absence of reform. This will result in people understanding that 
they probably will not receive the higher level of benefits, which will 
likely result in pressure on Congress to act. 
ORIGINALISM: RETURNING SOCIAL SECURITY TO  
ITS ROOTS
Originalism is a principle of legal interpretation that sees the U.S. 
Constitution as “fixed” as of the time of its enactment. Sometimes 
policy analysts base arguments for Social Security reform using the 
same concept—they cite the views of President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and aim to return Social Security to the way it was initially conceived, 
though those arguments tend to be selective as to which elements of 
Social Security to restore. I do not endorse the principle of original-
ism and argue instead that reforms should be judged on other grounds 
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discussed in this book. Nonetheless, five reforms that meet both sets 
of criteria have been discussed in this book. 
 1) Raise the payroll tax rate so that a higher percentage of total 
earnings are covered, as in the past. 
 2) Raise the retirement age to 63 rather than 65. 
 3) Reinstate a longevity insurance benefit that starts at age 
82. When Social Security was first started, it was primarily 
a longevity insurance benefit program that provided ben-
efits at an age where roughly half of those persons entering 
the workforce had died. While the language was not used 
to describe Social Security at the time, that description is 
consistent with how it actually worked and is consistent 
with the historical record as to how the age of 65 was 
selected for retirement benefit eligibility. Now it provides 
wage-replacement benefits to most people who entered the 
workforce. 
 4) Reduce the generosity of the adjustment of benefits for 
postponed retirement so that the adjustment is actuarially 
fair, as initially intended. This would save Social Security 
money and make the system more progressive. When the 
adjustment factors for calculating benefits with postponed 
retirement were first put in place, they were actuarially fair, 
meaning that a person with average life expectancy would 
receive the equivalent amount in present value of benefits 
if they delayed receipt of benefits for one year. Now the 
adjustment factor is generous and rewards those who post-
pone retirement. The problem is that the people benefiting 
from this feature are primarily upper-income workers, so 
the feature has become regressive in that it disproportion-
ately benefits them. 
 5) Add a caregiver’s credit. Social Security originally pro-
vided support for caregivers through the spousal benefit. 
While that benefit is still available, with the increase in 
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female labor force participation, increasingly, caregivers 
are receiving benefits in their own right, so that caregivers 
suffer a loss of Social Security benefits because of their time 
out of the labor force. Just as the spousal benefit recognizes 
the important contribution of work taking care of a fam-
ily in traditional families, a caregiver’s credit would be in 
the spirit of the original Social Security program in that it 
would recognize the contribution of caregivers in the con-
text of modern families.
THE FINAL WORD
Recognizing the political realities that some people are ada-
mantly opposed to Social Security benefit cuts and others are equally 
opposed to payroll tax increases, political compromise is clearly 
needed by both sides. Moreover, we need smart policies that mini-
mize the negative effects of the actions taken. 
Policy procrastination by Congress is arguably the biggest prob-
lem facing Social Security. It is time for this to end. Making policy 
changes in 2016, rather than in 2034, will result in fewer benefit cuts 
or lower payroll tax rate increases. It will also reduce the political 
risk for workers, Social Security beneficiaries, and employers. The 
current situation makes it difficult for workers to plan for retirement 
because of the uncertainty about what their future Social Security 
benefits will be.
Ultimately, Congress will decide how to reform Social Security, 
and thus it will be a political decision. The merits and problems with 
the various options will be weighed in the political context. Thus, the 
decision of whether to cut benefits or to raise taxes will be based on 
a political assessment of the effects of these proposals. Many people 
have expressed concern that a benefit cut would have a large effect 
on low-income people. That concern can be addressed by making tar-
geted benefit cuts through the benefit formula, rather than through an 
increase in the normal retirement age, and by having targeted benefit 
increases. 
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